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QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

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esulting from experience, so-called Critical Realism found the idea of conceptual preconditions<br />

for empirical knowledge acceptable. At the same time, these conceptual systems are seen as<br />

historically-developing and being consciously changeable, something which makes it possible to<br />

relinquish Kant’s agnosticism. Humans are not imprisoned by their fixed cognitive apparatus,<br />

they can, through scientific investigation, attempt to gain more perfect and more accurate<br />

knowledge of reality from “things as such”. 364<br />

As a result of the criticism of Positivism and the development of new tools, modern analytic<br />

tradition has been freed from many of the traditional restraints and obligations and many<br />

advocates of scientific realism have adopted a radical ”Anti-Positivist” view of the general<br />

nature of scientific theories. The Empiricist and Descriptivist view of scientific language turned<br />

out to be too confining when, for example, dispositional concepts could not be directly converted<br />

into observational terms. Claims of this type were alleviated by stating that scientific language<br />

could also accept terms which could be reduced to observational terms via explicit definitions<br />

and reductive statements. Hempel and Carnap liberalised this thinking to the dual-level theory of<br />

scientific language, according to which it was sufficient that some theoretical terms were<br />

connected to observationals term in a logical manner via a general proposition. In this way,<br />

scientific theory was understood to be a partly-interpreted formal system. This way of thinking<br />

did, however, result in problems since unambiguous criteria that could be used to separate<br />

theoretical terms from observational terminology did not exist. That which was observed<br />

depended on the experimental equipment being used by the observer, the conceptual system they<br />

were using, and their background knowledge. Observations were seen as theory-laden and<br />

proving the correctness of theories became problematical. 365<br />

Empiricism is no longer necessarily accepted, even in the modified form that Hempel and<br />

Carnap developed in the 1950s. Giving up the <strong>thesis</strong> of Semantic empiricism does, however,<br />

create new challenges when explicating problems concerning the interpretation of theoretical<br />

terms. According to Scientific Realism, theories are attempts to obtain knowledge concerning<br />

reality, and as such, they are true or untrue propositions whose truth must somehow be<br />

established. Via Descriptivism or Instrumentalism, problems connected with the interpretation of<br />

theoretical terms can be eliminated by concentrating only on their ”function” or their operation in<br />

science. If the task of science is viewed in a unilateral manner as the control of practical<br />

operations, the simple conclusion is Methodological instrumentalism. There is no need to take<br />

364 Niiniluoto 1980, 144.<br />

136

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