QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

The logic of inductive thought based on the principles expounded by Bacon became a tradition in
English philosophy which has survived until the present day, even though Bacon without doubt
over-estimated the the significance of induction as a scientific method. 205 In his enthusiasm for
inductive empiricism, Bacon forgot the importance of theory and deductive inferences when
building up knowledge. He did not see the researcher’s role in the creation of hypotheses, he
simply believed that the facts somehow spoke on their own behalf and that scientific propositions
could be derived without difficulty from observations with the assistance of eliminative
induction. Since the number of facts is potentially infinite, it is however necessary for a
researcher to be able to estimate which of them are actually relevant to the problem being
studied. In the marriage of empiricism and rationalism that Bacon dreamt of, rationalism was
very much the loser.
Only at a later date did philosophers of science acknowledge the significance of theoretical
presuppositions and hypotheses in the process of generating knowledge. The research problem
selected for investigation and its associated hypotheses ilfluence and direct the search for, and
selection of, relevant facts, the design of scientific experiments and the analysis of the resulting
observations. 206 Also, the shift from observed material to hypotheses normally requires, in
addition to generalisations, both the enrichment of terminology and the utilisation of new
concepts, neither of which can be achieved through the application of mechanical rules. It was on
this basis that in 1860, William Whewell (1794-1866), one of the most important pioneers of the
philosophy and history of science, criticised Bacon’s inductivism by stating that he had not
recognised the degree of creative ingenuity required for the generation of hypotheses. In a
similar manner one hundred years later, Hempel, like Whewell, stated that “Scientific hypotheses
and theories are not derived from observed facts, they are invented to explain them”. 207
It is not difficult to identify defects in Bacon’s controversial approach and figure. Experimental
science has never actually been studied in the manner Bacon had in his mind. Bacon actually did
very little to further the advancement of science and made unfair judgments about the
achievements of others. As an example of this, he did not attach much value to the work of either
Copernicus or Galilei. He did not fully understand the value of measurement and mathematics in
the formation of hypothetic-deductive theories, since he did not have a deeper knowledge of
205
von Wright 1987, 49-50.
206
Cohen ja Nagel 1934, 201, Hempel 166, 13.
207
Niiniluoto 1983, 124.
82