QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

4.3.4. Later attempts to interpret quantum mechanics by returning to the classical frame of
reference
In later interpretations of quantum mechanics, Bohr’s call for a fundamental reassessment of
physics’ customary methods of investigation has been forgotten. These interpretations have not
proposed changes or alterations in starting points as deep as was the case with the Copenhagen
interpretation, they have typically sought new ontological models in which the metaphysical
background presuppositions of classical physics such as Determinism, Reductionism and the
isolated detached observer can continue to be maintained. In particular, the idea in the
Copenhagen interpretation of an active observer, one whose examination and measurement of
nature influences the development of the process, has proved hard to accept. Developers of later
interpretations have continued to view nature as mechanical and objective and have been
unwilling to countenance a situation in which human aspirations and intentions have any
influence on the process of shaping reality.
The traditional starting point for later interpretations has led to the postulation of different
auxiliary hypotheses and to many incredible consequences such as the assumption that there are
many parallel universes. If the cost of accepting these is considered worth paying, it is possible
to attempt to hold on to the traditional approach and the presuppositions of the familiar
mechanistic-deterministic paradigm. These developments suggest that even an entire conception
of reality can be saved by different auxiliary hypotheses in the same way that such hypotheses
can be used to save an individual scientific theory. Assessment of the degree of simplicity and
credibility of these different models and interpretations represents a challenge for which it is
even more difficult to present clear responses and criteria than when weighing-up the correctness
of an individual theory.
Supporters of hidden-variable theories attempt to return quantum mechanics to being a classical
and deterministic theory by assuming that its apparently statistical nature is the result of us being
unable to recognise all the factors that affect the behaviour of a particle. This interpretation
rejects the idea in the Copenhagen interpretation that the wave function provides a complete
description of a system: i.e. that all systems which are described by the same wave function are
in the same state and physically identical. If this were so, why, for example in the double-slit
experiment, do identical electrons which are in the same state behave in different ways? Why
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