QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

Philosophers of science have often perceived these later interpretations as Realistic and in
contrast, the basically Realist tendency of the Copenhagen group is ignored, and their ideas are
often seen as either Positivist or Anti-realistic. Even if this label has some credibility when these
ideas are considered within the classical paradigm of science, the Copenhagen group did not
consider themselves to be Positivists. Against the wider perspective of natural philosophy, they
can be seen as true seekers for wider understanding.
The Copenhagen group were explicitly attempting to understand the nature of reality. They
abandoned the classical conception of reality but not because of Positivism. They realized that
quantum mechanics implied changes to previous metaphysical presuppositions. From the
Copenhagen point of view, the interpretation of quantum mechanics was not a question of
Instrumentalism or Phenomenalism or even of Realism, it was simply a new conception of
reality. In the light of their wider viewpoint, later interpretations appear as futile attempts to
return to classical metaphysics by postulating unfounded auxiliary hypotheses. These post-
Copenhagen interpretations can be seen in Kuhnian terms as efforts to hold onto a "normal
science", i.e. classical metaphysics, even when new evidence actually demanded entirely new
approaches.
From the long-sustained nature of the debate concerning interpretation, it is possible to conclude
that philosophers were not very much better prepared than physicists to deal with the profound
paradigm change that was being proposed. The Copenhagen group’s attempt to transcend the
earlier framework of reference would have demanded a fundamental re-evaluation of familiar
examination and classification categories, but philosophers were usually satisfied with an
analysis based on their previous concepts. It was disclosed that the thinking of the Copenhagen
group included Realist, Anti-realist, Kantian and Positivist features, but by using these
conventional definitions and classifications, philosophy of science is not able to arrive at a
position concerning natural philosophy in which the significance of the Copenhagen thinking can
be evaluated within the context in which it was being argued. Even though, for example,
investigation of Bohr’s doctrine of complementarity within different frames of philosophy of
science cast light on his concept and was helpful in understanding it better, it would be more
fruitful to examine the thinking of the Copenhagen group using the themes discussed within the
western philosophy of nature and the corresponding metaphysical background. 572
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