QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

defining the observation of phenomena as an objective proces that is independent of the
observer? 583 Heisenberg did not himself accept the thinking that the Copenhagen interpretation
was positivistic in any way. He considered a Positivist approach based on mathematical logic to
be too narrow. It was not suitable for a description of nature in which the employment of
imprecisely defined words and concepts was unavoidable. While Positivism considered an
observer’s sense perceptions to be elements of reality, the physical basis of the Copenhagen
interpretation was the objects and processes which could be described using classical
concepts. 584
Bohr also believed that the “phenomena” studied by physicists were born in interaction with
what we call reality. He understood observation as physical interaction between the system being
investigated and the equipment being used to make the observations, and did not accept the
thinking that the only thing being dealt with is sense experiences. Concerning the relationship
with Positivism, he said "I can readily agree with the Positivists about the things they want, but
not about the things they reject. ... Positivist insistence on conceptual clarity is, of course,
something I fully endorse, but their prohibition of any discussion of the wider issues, simply
because we lack clear-cut enough concepts in this realm, does not seem very useful to me - this
same ban would prevent our understanding of quantum theory." 585 The Copenhagen
interpretation does not therefore in any way demand a defence of the simple statement that ”what
cannot be observed does not exist”. Supporters of the interpretation are only bound to the thought
that that which can be observed certainly exists and about that which we do not observe we are
still free to make suitable assumptions in order to overcome paradoxes. 586
The problem of objectivisation led Bohr and Heisenberg to problematise the nature of language
and mathematics. They did not believe that humans had an access to language which would be
suitable for describing reality at all levels and which would automatically correspond to the
structure of reality. The conscious acceptance that methods of description are inadequate does
not however mean that reality itself must be rejected. Even though humans cannot obtain direct
583 Heisenberg 1958, 4.
584 Heisenberg 1958, 85. Heisenberg 1962, 22.
585 Heisenberg 1971, 207-208. Henry Folse, a philosopher of science, has often stressed that Bohr should not be
interpreted as a positivist or a phenomenalist. H. Krips also believes that Bohr and Heisenberg were not anti-realists
in the metaphysical sense. Krips 1990, 1.
586 Von Weizsäcker 1980, 183-184. The statement concerning the certain existence of the observed should not be
taken as naïve empiricism forbidding the theory-ladenness of observations. In the light of new knowledge,
observations can be interpreted in a new way.
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