The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

4. Delivering Quality Services
Highlights
Although outcomes of Bank-financed operations improved significantly over the past two decades,
there has been a significant decline in outcome ratings since FY06.
Quality assurance systems are more effective for lending than for ESW and are weakest for NLTA.
The focus on reputational risk has crowded out attention to other aspects of quality of lending
operations.
Accountability for quality is highest for task team leaders and nonexistent for sector directors.
Regional sector units, responsible for operational delivery, are receiving a decreasing share of
regional budgets.
Messages from senior management, control over task budgets, and desires for promotion and
salary increase are the primary incentives for meeting lending targets.
Job satisfaction and recognition by peers are the primary incentives for “matrix behaviors”
designed to improve development outcomes, including focusing on results, collaborating across
sectors, and mobilizing Bank-wide expertise.
Disincentives arising out of budgetary and information management rules discourage cross-sector
collaboration.
Introduction
4.1 The matrix system was designed to strengthen the Bank’s ability to deliver
quality services that combine relevant local solutions with global knowledge. This
was to be achieved by the combination of country priorities articulated by country
management and global technical expertise brought to bear by sector management
and the Bank-wide networks.
4.2 The key question this chapter seeks to answer is “Are incentives and
accountability mechanisms aligned in a manner that rewards high quality in
client services and results?” To answer this question, the evaluation assesses the
extent to which:
incentives and accountabilities are clearly defined to assure quality.
financing and budget incentives influence the quality of outputs and promote
effective knowledge and technical services.
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