The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES large share of ESW in such a short period of time. Furthermore, decision meetings are held within 10 days of delivery to the client for more than 15 percent of these studies. Some studies are even shared with the client the day of the meeting. 4.29 The June fiscal year deadline in effect “cuts off” the period in which a task team can make significant improvements before sharing analytical work with a client, causing much of the problem. Budget rules create considerable uncertainty for task teams: allocations for a product in a given fiscal year must be disbursed that year, and there is no guarantee additional resources will be made available in subsequent years. A very large share of ESW products—over 40 percent—is delivered in June, the final month of the fiscal year. Among those products delivered within 30 days of the decision meeting, more than 60 percent over FY00-FY11, and more than 70 percent in FY11, were delivered in June. In focus groups and interviews, staff indicated that review meetings for products facing a fiscal year deadline are perfunctory—in practice everyone in the room is aware of the fiscal year crunch, and no one has an incentive to slow down the process unless deficiencies are extreme. Peer reviewers have also been known to self-censor their comments so that they might be addressed within the time available. Figure 4.3 The Quality Assurance System has Little Time to Influence many Studies Share of ESWs with a decision meeting 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Less than 30 days between decision meeting and delivery to client, 3‐year centered average Less than 10 days between decision meeting and delivery to client, 3‐year centered average FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 Source: Business Warehouse THE ROLE OF NETWORK ANCHORS AND SECTOR BOARDS ON QUALITY 4.30 Although the matrix system had envisaged that sector units would perform the primary role of ensuring technical excellence and quality services, the network anchors and Sector Boards have played a minimal role in quality assurance. Anchor 71
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES units review corporate documents and sometimes contribute to high-risk projects, but for the most part quality assurance has been left to regional sector units that may invite individuals from anchor units to be peer reviewers. 4.31 Quality enhancement reviews (QERs)—meetings focused on quality held during preparation and chaired by the sector manager—were introduced 10 years ago and provide a structural role for anchor units but they have become optional, are often not timely and are not being systematically used, except in HDN and in two of the six Regions (East Asia and the Pacific and Africa). 4.32 The majority of staff report that anchor units have little influence over the quality of regional operations. Thirteen percent of the 342 respondents to the staff survey (including anchor staff) reported that anchor units substantially enhanced the quality of their operations, and 22 percent reported that anchor units provided direct operation support to Regions to a substantial or large extent. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL OPERATIONAL SERVICES UNITS 4.33 The regional OS units are the regional nodes of the OPCS network and have dual reporting to the regional vice presidents and OPCS. The regional OS units typically have four functions, with a fifth added in some Regions: (a) quality review of all lending operations in the Region during project preparation, with intermittent review during supervision; (b) quality control: clearances and signoff for fiduciary and safeguards issues in all operations; (c) direct operational services on financial management and procurement to all task teams; and (d) coordinating knowledge and learning services for staff in the Regions. In most of the Regions they are also responsible for (e) coordinating trust funds. 4.34 The existence of responsibility both for fiduciary and safeguards quality control, and provision of operational services for fiduciary areas, and quality reviews of all operations within the same organizational unit creates multiple conflicts of interest. Both of these functions—quality control and operational support for fiduciary areas (financial management and procurement)—currently reside within the regional OS departments and contribute to fiduciary and safeguards receiving excessive attention compared to other aspects of quality. The separation of quality control for safeguards from operational services on environmental and social issues is evidence that management is aware of the risk of conflict of interest. The housing of financial management and procurement in the OS departments also results in their separation from the upstream dimensions of public expenditure management that is handled by the public sector governance unit. The additional responsibility for quality review—in addition to operational support and quality control—creates yet another conflict of interest. The incentives of OS 72
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
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APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
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APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
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Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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