The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

OVERVIEW
subsequent increase reflects heightened
attention to fiduciary areas. A few high profile
investigations of corruption and safeguards
have resulted in widespread defensive
behavior, leading many country directors and
some sector units to add staff to undertake
additional quality reviews focused on
operational risks that could damage the
Bank’s reputation. Feedback from staff and
managers indicate that the Bank’s quality
control systems are more concerned with
fiduciary and safeguard risks than with other
aspects of quality. These aspects of quality do
not have to be mutually exclusive but the role
and accountability of sector and network
anchors would need to be enhanced to
strengthen quality.
There are insufficient incentives to focus
on quality and results. Despite the intent to
move away from a lending bank, the incentive
to prioritize lending delivery for managers and
staff alike is incontestable. Staff are clear that
they receive more encouragement to meet
lending targets than to focus on results. The
pressure for end-of-fiscal-year delivery leaves
little time to address quality issues identified
through the review process. The peer review
process to enhance the quality of projects and
ESW is also affected by similar incentives. The
selection of peer reviewers is not well managed
and the peer reviewers are aware of the need to
deliver products under tight deadlines. Final
review meetings for ESW are often scheduled
toward the end of the fiscal year, which
undermines the potential value of peer review
feedback, as there is hardly enough time to
address substantial comments.
The matrix system was put in place in part
to ensure delivery of quality services by
Bank-wide networks of sector specialists.
Quality enhancement reviews were introduced
by QAG in FY00 to focus on quality by
enhancing the role of sector specialists. They
were subsequently transferred to the networks
and Regions but have become optional and are
often not timely. The checks and balances
created by a mechanism, independent of line
management, to take periodic stock of the
robustness of the Bank’s quality assurance
system, disappeared with the dissolution of
QAG in 2010. An alternate mechanism has not
yet been put in place. Staff lack incentives to
focus on quality since outcomes of operations
and knowledge work are not linked to the
Bank’s performance management system.
Quality assurance systems under the
matrix system continue to be more robust
for lending operations than for ESW and
weakest for non-lending technical
assistance. Non-lending technical assistance
has widely varying quality. QAG reviews of
AAA are the main source of evidence on
AAA quality used in the Knowledge Report.
With QAG disbanded, the Bank has lost its
sole mechanism for autonomous review of
AAA quality.
Sector managers have to cope with
excessive span of control. The span of
control of regional sector managers—
managing 37 staff on average, compared to 7-
15 in comparator external organizations and 19
in IFC—is unrealistic, making it impossible for
them to provide quality control for all lending
and non-lending operations produced in their
unit. They are forced to rely on sub-regional or
country-based shadow managers, introducing
an extra layer of non-technical review, but they
are not always experts within the sector. Span
of control issues are most acute in the Africa
Region (54 staff per sector manager) and in the
Sustainable Development Network (47 staff
per sector manager). In FY12, management has
announced its intention to reduce the span of
control of sector managers to a maximum of
35 staff per manager. While this will reduce the
workload of the most overburdened managers,
it still remains two or more times higher than
that of comparator organizations.
Budget pressures are also adding risks to
delivery of quality services. The first
indicator on organizational effectiveness and
xxvi