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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES Results report. The Bank has never met its target of 5 percent or lower. The disconnect has been at least 14 percent in every year since FY07. 4.10 The realism index compares self-ratings to recent history: it is the ratio of the percentage of actual problem projects in the active portfolio and the percentage of operations with moderately unsatisfactory or worse outcomes as rated by IEG for the most recent completions (1,000 evaluations), on a rolling basis. The Bank has set a target of 70 percent for its realism, and despite improvement over the past decade, the target has only been met once (in FY09) in the past 10 years 4.11 IEG ratings of the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in operations assess the extent to which M&E systems were appropriately designed, implemented, and utilized and serve as a measure of the real-time feedback available for project management. These ratings were fully introduced for operations exiting the portfolio beginning in FY05. A high quality rating would indicate an M&E system with a strong influence on project performance. M&E systems have been weak during the entire period for which data are available, with just 25 percent rated of substantial or high quality among operations closing in FY10, and never more than 36 percent reaching that threshold. The Bank has not identified a target for this rating, but compared to the other dimensions assessed by IEG highlighted above, these ratings are very low. 4.12 One last indicator—the proactivity index—measures the extent to which the Bank has taken action when problems arise, and is defined as the proportion of projects rated as actual problem projects 12 months earlier that have been upgraded, restructured, suspended, closed, or partially (20 percent plus of commitments) or fully canceled. This index has followed a downward path for a decade, dropping to 60 percent in FY01. It has not met its target of 80 percent since FY08. Institutional Incentives for Quality INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR CLIENT ORIENTATION AND TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE AFTER 1997 4.13 The 1997 reforms differ qualitatively from the earlier ones in the budgetary arrangements and introduction of dual reporting relationships. The success of the matrix reform was predicated on the alignment between the new organizational arrangements and accompanying incentives, and on the effectiveness of the framework of formal and informal incentives. The new organizational arrangements consisted of (a) reducing the number of countries covered by each country unit (thus increasing client orientation), (b) creating networks (and Sector Boards) to link technical sector units at the regional and Bank-wide level (to increase global technical 65
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES expertise available to country teams), and (c) creating network anchors (to facilitate exchanges of global technical knowledge among the sector units and with external partners). In addition, decentralization was intended to increase client orientation by facilitating more frequent contacts with clients. The formal incentives consisted of country budgets allocated by country units to the different sector units and the dual reporting relationships in the sector units. This, and not the creation of the networks and Sector Boards (or decentralization), is what makes the reforms of 1997 qualitatively different from the earlier ones and made the Bank a matrix-managed institution. 4.14 New budgetary arrangements were introduced with country budgets allocated to sector units by country departments to enhance client orientation. Prior institutional arrangements left excessive room for supply-driven behavior by sector units because of their ability to deploy budget resources to countries without need for approval by the country units. Although this problem had been reduced after the reorganization of 1987 it had not completely disappeared. After 1997 the introduction of country budgets was intended to allow the country units (country director/CMU) to purchase services from the different sector units in line with the CAS and country needs. Sector units, on the other hand, had the skills (technical staff) but needed to finance their staff with budget allocations from different country units. The fluctuating demand among countries was expected to balance out, particularly with arrangements designed to make Bank-wide resources available to individual country teams through cross-sector teamwork and cross support. 4.15 The formal incentive of dual reporting relationships in the sector units was envisaged to ensure technical excellence and strategic alignment between country and sector strategies. The founding documents envisaged that regional sector managers and sector directors would report to the regional vice president as well as to the network vice presidents. Sector staff members working in a given country were expected to report to their sector managers as well as to the country directors. In practice, formal reporting arrangements for sector staff were to their regional sector managers, while informal incentives, particularly for staff decentralized to country offices induced them to be more responsive to country directors. Country units, however, continued to operate in a line management environment: country directors report only to regional vice-presidents. Moreover, as discussed in chapter two, alignment between country and sector strategies has been weak. 4.16 The matrix system was put in place in part to ensure delivery of quality services by Bank-wide networks of sector specialists. Quality enhancement reviews were introduced by QAG in FY00 to focus on quality by enhancing the role of sector specialists. They were subsequently transferred to the networks and Regions. 66
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
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APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
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APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
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Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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