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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK’S COUNTRY PROGRAMS driven by emerging demands by the client, and in Madagascar (FY04-08), where the government showed strong backing of reforms to support the private sector and a willingness to adopt new approaches suggested by the Bank. 12. For the other 61 programs, country ownership was rated as less than satisfactory. In an overwhelming majority of cases, government commitment to the Bank’s reform agenda embedded in its program appeared weak from the outset. For example, in Cameroon (FY04-08), political economy factors held the program back. The Bank was seen as imposing its own agenda, and while there were consultations, the Bank could have worked to cultivate ownership. In Bangladesh (FY01-04), several areas of reform did not have government support, particularly the governance reform agenda, but that support may have been attainable with more consistent policy dialogue. Figure C.1. Most Programs Had Weak Government Ownership from the Outset 13. In a few cases, government support weakened or government priorities changed during the period. This was the case in Mauritania (FY03-07), where government interest in reform waned rapidly after the country reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. In the remaining CASs, the key problem was that the Bank’s consultation with stakeholders was insufficient to ensure broad-based support. For instance, in Brazil (FY 04-07) the CAS preparation was highly participatory, but some components of the program—particularly lending to municipalities, which ultimately led to conflict with the Ministry of Finance—was not sufficiently discussed with all the relevant players. And in El Salvador (FY05-09), the program should have reached beyond the executive branch in order to mitigate political gridlock. Realism 14. Realism was also rated low. Only about a third of country programs—31 of the 96 that were rated—demonstrated moderately satisfactory or satisfactory realism in 127
APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK’S COUNTRY PROGRAMS country program design. There was no change in the realism ratings over time, with 32 percent rated moderately satisfactory or better in the second half of the period of review, compared to 33 percent in the first half. 15. Four programs were explicitly singled out as fully realistic in their CASCR reviews. The program in Guatemala (FY05-08) fell into this category. There, the Bank carefully calibrated its program to take into account risky political conditions, using single-tranche programmatic loans that would allow it to adjust the program as needed. 16. Twenty-seven other programs were also moderately satisfactory or better in terms of their realism. Most had only minor shortcomings with regard to their estimation of national capacity, estimation of government commitment, identification of appropriate lending targets and outcome objectives, and selectivity and prioritization. For example, in Rwanda (FY03-08) the lending and non-lending program were considered realistic, with slightly ambitious overall objectives. There were some minor project delays due to gaps in government capacity. The satisfactory program categories are summarized in Figure C.2. Figure C.2. Most Programs Were Not Realistically Designed 17. In the two-thirds of programs that were not realistically designed, the major culprits were poor assessments of national capacity constraints, absorptive capacity and robustness of government commitment, the desire for lending , and/or Bank capacity constraints (as manifested in a lack of selectivity). Indeed, many programs made misjudgments along several of these dimensions, with over half considered unrealistic along at least two, as shown in Figure C. 3. 18. An overestimation of government capacity was the most common shortcoming, occurring in half of the unsatisfactory programs, and a third of programs overall. For example, in Yemen (FY03-05) the program included complex investments and AAA for which the country did not have sufficient implementation capacity, and in Ukraine (FY01-03 and FY04-07), a large number of lending operations were planned 128
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
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CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
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CHAPTER 3 THE PROMISE OF A KNOWLEDG
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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
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Page 145 and 146: 6. Conclusions and Recommendations
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Page 152 and 153: Appendix A Matrix Management and Or
Page 154 and 155: APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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