The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
CHAPTER 4<br />
DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES<br />
to results was followed immedi<strong>at</strong>ely by a list of the volume of commitments and<br />
investments by each arm of the <strong>World</strong> Bank <strong>Group</strong>. <strong>The</strong> priority given to lending<br />
(while not new) and the numeric count of knowledge products r<strong>at</strong>her than results<br />
gener<strong>at</strong>e incentives for management and staff th<strong>at</strong> can lead to suboptimal outcomes.<br />
Managing for Quality under the <strong>M<strong>at</strong>rix</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
QUALITY UNDER THE MATRIX SYSTEM<br />
4.20 <strong>The</strong> m<strong>at</strong>rix system was expected to simplify review processes with clear<br />
responsibilities for quality. <strong>The</strong> design of the m<strong>at</strong>rix system had envisaged dual<br />
responsibility: the articul<strong>at</strong>ion of client demand was the responsibility of country<br />
management, while primary responsibility for quality rested with the managers of<br />
sector units. Quality was to be ensured through a simplified, two-stage review<br />
process for project appraisals, supplemented by independent reviews by QAG to<br />
provide third-party feedback to senior management on the quality of the portfolio.<br />
In practice, additional formal and informal quality control functions have been<br />
added to the “simplified review process.” Sector managers interviewed for this<br />
evalu<strong>at</strong>ion consider these multiple roles, incentives, and accountabilities to be<br />
“absolutely inconsistent with the official [m<strong>at</strong>rix] arrangements.”<br />
4.21 <strong>The</strong> m<strong>at</strong>rix systems’ aim to improve quality has been undermined by the<br />
growing number of quality assurance layers in different units—sector units,<br />
regional OS units, and CMUs—with a growing emphasis on oper<strong>at</strong>ional risks th<strong>at</strong><br />
could damage the Bank’s reput<strong>at</strong>ion, with rel<strong>at</strong>ively less <strong>at</strong>tention to other aspects<br />
of quality and development impact. CMUs were originally expected to rely on<br />
quality assurance systems established <strong>at</strong> the regional level and the sector level. Over<br />
time, they have hired oper<strong>at</strong>ional advisers and other oper<strong>at</strong>ional staff in the CMUs,<br />
adding another layer of clearance and quality control. <strong>The</strong> country directors’ role in<br />
quality assurance receives mixed appreci<strong>at</strong>ion. While some sector managers who<br />
were interviewed view their role and the additional layers of control they have<br />
introduced as helpful, others find them both misplaced and redundant. “Two sets<br />
of eyes (in the CMU and the SMU) looking <strong>at</strong> the portfolio are better than just one. It<br />
is good to have the CMU also look over quality.” But also, “I am accountable for<br />
quality but the CMUs have also started doing technical reviews through their own<br />
quality assurance systems because accountabilities are not clear and they want to<br />
protect themselves.” 54 Moreover, the quality improvements from these additional<br />
layers often consist of safeguarding against risk or present<strong>at</strong>ional changes in project<br />
documents r<strong>at</strong>her than substantive changes in project design.<br />
68