The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

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APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK from each of the Regions and a director located in the network anchor. For individual staff, there is no dual reporting in the big matrix. SMU and CMU staff ultimately report to the regional vice president; network anchor staff report to the network vice president. Moreover, there is no equivalent of a WPA, nor requirement that staff provide direct support to tasks managed in one of the other VPUs (whether network or Region). A representation of the Bank-wide matrix is depicted in Figure A.2. Figure A.2. The Bank-wide Matrix Note: SB=Sector Board; NVP=network vice president; RVP=regional vice president Organizational Arrangements before 1997. 7. The existence of geographically organized country units and technical sector units does not necessitate a matrix management system. Like other organizations in the public and private sectors with a diverse client base and a broad range of products, the Bank has operated with an internal structure that included client groups (programs departments, country departments, and CMUs) and product groups (technical departments, sector divisions, central vice presidencies) for several decades. The tensions between the two groups have been managed through a combination of institutional arrangements and reporting relationships, as well as informal incentives. Prior to the 1997 reforms, the management arrangements remained hierarchical, with staff members and middle managers reporting directly to a single line supervisor. 113
APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 8. In the much smaller Bank of the 1960s and early 1970s, the project groups were central (Bank-wide) projects departments, dealing with client groups that formed what we now know as regional VPUs. As the Bank expanded rapidly in the 1970s under President Robert Strange McNamara, the central projects departments were gradually spun off into regional projects departments (by the mid 1970s there were still a combination of regional and central project departments), so that the search for an equilibrium (and creative tension) between client and product groups was shifted to the Regions and the conflict resolution role was placed on the regional vice president. 9. In 1987 a different mechanism was introduced, as highlighted in [Box A.1] to regulate the relationship between country and sector units, in response to an assessment that that client orientation was weak, and sector units operated in a supply-driven manner. Thereafter, country and sector units operated together under a single director with technical staff split into sector divisions under the country director. Box A.1. A Thumbnail Sketch of the 1987 Reorganization After its initial contributions to postwar reconstruction, until the 1970s, the Bank financed mainly physical infrastructure and progressively expanded to other sectors, but always with a project focus. Its internal organization and rules were consistent with that focus. Most substantive decisions on choosing what project to support and in what country, as well as the project design, supervision, and implementation, were entrusted to specialists in technical departments. The economic development literature of the late 1950s and 1960s made evident that a project cannot achieve its development objectives if the “strategy of development” is defective and the surrounding economic policy environment is deficient or distortionary (Hirschman, 1958). Next there was recognition of the fungibility of financial resources (De Vries, 1967). A project financed by an aid donor and prepared under strict technical standards, in fact, released the government’s own resources (or aid from a less demanding source) to finance another project X which may be neither technically nor economically sound (Schiavo-Campo and Singer, 1970). In reality, the donor enabled project X, of which it knew little, while reassuring itself that its financial support met the highest technical and economic requirements. And, if the donor-financed project was not a government priority, neither the donor-financed project nor the aid was likely to be effective. By the 1970s, it became necessary to consider the economic profile of all public investment, as well as the soundness of the policy framework that conditioned the projects’ rate of return in national economic terms. The Bank’s approach began to evolve from an exclusive focus on isolated projects to the probable development impact of the entire public investment portfolio and, later, of public expenditure as a whole. In the meantime, under the McNamara presidency, the World Bank’s resources expanded several fold, leading to a scarcity of “bankable” projects, increasing doubts about the quality of lending, and a view of the institution as a “hobbled giant” (Please, 1984) constrained by its project-dominated culture and organizational structure. This led to a gradual shift toward “program” lending, linked to the soundness of the public investment program and the economic policy framework of the recipient government. 114
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
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CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
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CHAPTER 3 THE PROMISE OF A KNOWLEDG
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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