The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES occur in practice? Recent IEG evaluations of health, nutrition, and population (2010), social safety nets (2011), agriculture and agribusiness (2011), and climate change (2009) flagged weak cross-sector collaboration as both systemic and as an important barrier to good development outcomes. What do the data show? 4.44 An expectation of cross-sector and cross-thematic work is typical, but declining, in the design of operations. On average, 45 percent of each operation approved by the Bank between FY1995 and FY2010 was flagged as devoted to a sector not affiliated with the Sector Board that governed the operation. 55 The share for investment lending was lower—at 41 percent—and relatively flat until FY07, after which it began a steep decline to 33 percent for the three-year average over FY08-10, as shown in Figure 4.4. For non-affiliated themes, the share was 56 percent over the period for all operations and 55 percent for investment loans. The share devoted to non-affiliated themes among investment loans rose modestly to 61 percent in FY01, after which it began a steady decline, dropping to 46 percent for the three-year average over FY08-10. Appendix J provides more details. Figure 4.4. Average Share of Investment Loans Allocated to Non-affiliated Sectors and Themes 70% 60% Avg. allocation of investment lending to non-affiliated themes (3-year centered average) 50% 40% 30% Avg. allocation of operations to non-affiliated sectors (3-year centered average) 20% FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Source: Business Warehouse 4.45 DPLs are designed as more cross-sectoral and cross-thematic than investment loans. The average proportion of development policy operations devoted to non-affiliated sectors and themes rose steadily over the period, exceeding 70 percent for both for the three-year average over FY08-10. But even for DPLs, the policy focus inherent in the operation makes it easier to indicate linkages to multiple 77
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES sectors without actual collaboration across sector units, as demonstrated in IEG’s evaluation of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (IEG 2010e). 4.46 But the Bank has not been able to mobilize the relevant expertise to deliver these cross-sector and cross-thematic operations: actual collaboration across sectors by staff working in different units is far below expectations. One of the objectives of matrix reform was to break the silos of sector staff trapped in divisions within separate country departments. The creation of Bank-wide Sector Boards and regional SMUs helped to break those silos but re-created them at the regional and network levels. In FY10, total cross support—work by a staff member of one organizational unit for another unit—was 19 percent, of which about 14 percent was within VPUs 56 (mostly across sectors) and 5 percent across VPUs (inter-VPU). Collaboration across sectors within the Regions is much better than elsewhere. But even the combined inter- and intra-regional cross support is far below what could be expected from the cross-sector and cross-thematic design of operations, as encapsulated by the assignment of 50 percent and 64 percent of the portfolio to nondedicated sectors and themes, respectively. If task teams themselves recognize the cross-sectoral nature of their projects, what disincentives come in the way of actual collaboration across sector units? 4.47 The Bank’s budget processes have not been effective in promoting crosssector collaboration and teamwork under the matrix system. The inability to share tasks and budgets across organizational units discourages this type of cross-sector collaboration. Creating cross-sectoral teams for multisectoral tasks has proved particularly difficult. Interviews with staff and sector managers and feedback from the focus groups suggest that the inability to share responsibility and budget for tasks across organizational units is a major hindrance, a finding similar to that in IEG’s social safety net evaluation (IEG 2011). Even when organizational units seek to collaborate with each other, budget rules do not permit co-management of a task or subdivision of budgets. One unit must be declared the managing unit with a single task team leader accountable for the task, while staff members from other units have to charge their time on a transactional basis. Sector managers try to retain their most valued staff, which tend to be in greatest demand, to work on activities for which the manager will be held accountable. One sector manager captured the perspective of many: “Business brought in by a sector stays in the sector…There isn't even a point in the system when the possibility of cross-sectoral or cross-regional teamwork can be considered.” 78
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
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CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
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Page 145 and 146: 6. Conclusions and Recommendations
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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
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APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
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Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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