The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 16. The main formal incentive introduced by the matrix system to affect client orientation was the country budget and allocation. All prior institutional arrangements were thought to have left excessive room for supply-driven behavior by SMUs because of their ability to deploy budget resources to countries without need for approval by the client teams. Although this problem had been reduced after 1987, it had not completely disappeared. Thus, after 1997, the introduction of country budgets was intended to allow the client groups (country director, CMU) to purchase services from the different product groups (sector manager, SMU) in line with the country assistance strategy and country needs. Product groups, on the other hand, had the skills (technical staff) but needed to finance their staff with budget allocations from different client groups. The fluctuating demand among countries was expected to balance out, particularly with arrangements designed to make Bank-wide resources available to individual country teams through the Bankwide networks and Sector Boards. 17. The other major matrix management incentive, to guarantee technical excellence and strategic alignment between country and sector strategies was the dual reporting relationships in the product teams. Technical staff working in a given country report to their sector managers as well as to the country directors, and regional sector managers and sector directors report to the regional vice presidents as well as to the network vice presidents. Client teams, however, continued to operate in a line management environment: country directors report only to regional vice presidents (but their performance reviews have inputs from regional sector managers and directors). 18. The above set of formal incentives continues to date, 14 years after introduction, although with some adjustments in the institutional arrangements (e.g. change in the number of networks) and in the matrix management (particularly budget mechanisms). 19. Informal incentives: organizational culture and external effects. Formal incentives are only part of the mechanisms that determine behavior, and are often affected, enhanced, or even overwhelmed by informal incentives. In the case of the reforms adopted in 1997, the two main types of informal incentives were the Bank’s organizational culture and the external effects. 20. Changing external conditions have been particularly important in the 14-year period since the matrix system was introduced. The external conditions facing the Bank changed suddenly, the day after implementation of the reforms formally began, subjecting the new system to unanticipated stress that led to behaviors that were inconsistent with matrix operations. 21. On July 2, 1997, the devaluation of the Thai baht ushered a major regional (East Asian) crisis that later spread to other countries such as Brazil and Russia. With it, 117
APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK there was a major drying up of private capital flows to developing countries, and a sudden increase in demand for Bank financing. The sudden increase in demand, and in the approval of quick disbursement loans, took management attention away from the support of the new matrix instruments and arrangements. 22. Some of the responses to the crisis were totally contrary to the principles of the reforms, particularly the leading roles of country directors and CMUs. The most important of these responses was the establishment of the special financial operations unit (SFO) which was given budget and, effectively, autonomy from the CMUs in which it operated. This created considerable resentment between the affected CMUs and the SFO and, arguably, cast doubt on the support from senior management for the principles of the new matrix arrangements. At the same time, it was also criticized by CMUs that did not have access to the SFO resources, as source of budget misallocation. Thus, it alienated both groups of client teams and weakened the foundations of the new budgetary principles. 23. The new budgetary system also quickly ran into difficulties because its detailed functioning principles had been left undefined, and in the first few years, the transaction costs became very high, and because the uncertainty associated with the large number of technical staff members (and their managers) who were concerned about finding effective demand for their services led to a new source of supplydriven behaviors and to efforts to ensure new tasks (to “fill the dance cards”). 24. During the early 2000s, as the global economy recovered and private capital flows gradually rematerialized, the external conditions turned again closer to those that had led to the 1997 reforms: demand for Bank lending decreased, particularly from upper middle-income countries, including major repayments and reductions in country exposure. During this period, budgetary mechanisms were improved, as were some of the coordination mechanisms. Faced with the decline in demand, however, senior management encouraged lending increases, particularly in infrastructure, sometimes at the expense of developing cutting edge technical skills and knowledge generation and dissemination. 25. In 2008, a new change in external conditions, the global financial crisis, led again to large increases in demand and in lending, mainly through development policy loans (DPLs), which have required leadership by CMUs, with only limited involvement of the SMUs (except for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, PREM). This may have reduced again the effectiveness of “matrix behaviors” sought by the 1997 reforms. 26. Organizational culture (including the “loan approval culture”) also played a major factor in counteracting the incentives to use global knowledge through increased cooperation among sectors and across Regions. The 1992 Wapenhans report identified a focus on lending volume rather than implementation and 118
Page 1 and 2:
The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
Page 3 and 4:
©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
Page 5 and 6:
Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
Page 7 and 8:
Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
Page 10:
Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
Page 14 and 15:
Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
Page 16 and 17:
GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
Page 18 and 19:
Overview The Matrix System at Work
Page 20 and 21:
OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
Page 22 and 23:
OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
Page 24 and 25:
OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
Page 26 and 27:
OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
Page 28 and 29:
OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
Page 30 and 31:
OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
Page 32 and 33:
OVERVIEW management structure but t
Page 34 and 35:
OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
Page 36 and 37:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
Page 38 and 39:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
Page 40:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
Page 43 and 44:
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
Page 61 and 62:
CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
CHAPTER 3 THE PROMISE OF A KNOWLEDG
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
Page 105 and 106:
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
Page 107 and 108: CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
Page 123 and 124: CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND
Page 145 and 146: 6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 147 and 148: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND
Page 149 and 150: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND
Page 152 and 153: Appendix A Matrix Management and Or
Page 154 and 155: APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
Page 162 and 163: SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
Page 164 and 165: APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
Page 166 and 167: APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
Page 176 and 177: APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
Page 196 and 197: Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
Page 198 and 199: APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
Page 206 and 207: Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
Page 208 and 209:
APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
Page 210 and 211:
# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
Page 212 and 213:
APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
Page 214 and 215:
APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
Page 216 and 217:
APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
Page 218 and 219:
Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
Page 220 and 221:
APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Appendix H Working across Organizat
Page 228 and 229:
APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
Page 240 and 241:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
Page 242 and 243:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
Page 244 and 245:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
Page 246 and 247:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
Page 248 and 249:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
Page 250 and 251:
APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
Page 258 and 259:
APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
Page 260 and 261:
APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
Page 262 and 263:
Appendix L International Finance Co
Page 264 and 265:
APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
Page 272 and 273:
APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
Page 274 and 275:
Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
Page 276 and 277:
References Barnett, Michael N. and
Page 278 and 279:
REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
Page 280 and 281:
Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
Page 282 and 283:
ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
Page 284 and 285:
ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
Page 286:
ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
show all

The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?