The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

APPENDIX E
KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR MANAGER AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR/MANAGER INTERVIEWS
“The acquisition of [trust funds] and allocation of staff time is always secondary to the need to deliver
on lending operations. Moreover, in middle-income country-dominated Regions like Europe and
Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, the budget is declining--leaving very little for
knowledge activities of any kind. If the Bank is serious about knowledge, it must resource it
separately, adequately and with appropriate recognition to the staff involved--rather than rely so
heavily on lending as the metric of success.”
"The rhetoric about the 'knowledge Bank' is wishful thinking devoid of reality. All the pressure is for
lending, and within lending for new lending rather than supervision. If the Bank really wants to
encourage knowledge, it should put muscle and money behind it, both of which are now not there."
Incentives and Accountability for Quality
19. Relative roles, incentives, and accountability are considered "absolutely
inconsistent with the official arrangements.” An example cited more than once is
the example of clearances processes and their tendency to go “up and down
different levels of authority.” Sector managers typically described accountability
for quality as being high for the sector manager and the task team leader (TTL),
none for the sector director and substantial for the country director. Sector
directors are deemed accountable only for cases where technical assistance has
substantial potential impact on country dialogue. Accountability systems are
described as clearer and more effective for lending than ESW. Accountability for
non-lending technical assistance (NLTA) is weak across the board.
20. Ninety-three percent (28/30) of sector managers and all country
directors/managers believe that the current incentives and accountability
mechanisms ensure the accountability of TTLs for lending operations to a
substantial extent. Sector managers’ accountability for lending was rated substantial
in 90 percent of cases by sector managers and in 55 percent of cases by country
directors. Sector directors’ accountability for lending operations was described as
substantial (or very large) by only 13 percent (4/30) of sector managers and 9
percent (1/11) of country directors. Accountability of country directors and
managers was rated higher in Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North
Africa and South Asia than in other Regions. A South Asia sector manager insisted
that “[d]despite the theoretical matrix assumption of sector accountability for quality, if a
major lending operation goes wrong, it is the country director who gets the heat since s/he's
the one interacting directly with the both the client and the RVP (or the president, in case of
a very large country or a high-profile problem). This is the only logical and functional aspect
of the matrix since in effect the country director calls all the shots, s/he also bears the de facto
responsibility.” A Europe and Central Asia sector manager further argued that, “TTLs
carry by far the highest responsibility for lending quality, with significant involvement of
country directors and none at all by sector directors. For AAA, accountability is shared
between [the] TTL and sector manager, with virtually no input from the sector director and
country director.”
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