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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK’S COUNTRY PROGRAMS despite past experience with long-standing implementation constraints and limits to institutional capacity. 19. The next most common reason for low realism was over-ambitiousness in lending targets. This was evident in Romania (FY06-09) where lending targets were high despite the government’s moderate interest in remaining engaged with the Bank, and the Russian Federation (FY03-06) where the Bank proposed a large lending program in the face of slow disbursement of existing project loans and a general reluctance to borrow. 20. An over-estimation of government commitment was evident in about a third of unsatisfactory country programs. In Mauritius (FY02-06), the strategy was bold, but similar to the previous strategy, which was unable to influence policy reform. The government declined to take on two of the three public expenditure reform loans, an action that may have been predicted given the knowledge that Mauritius often cancels requests for donor financing. In Ethiopia (FY03-07), the Bank overestimated the government’s commitment to private sector development, and so made little progress on key issues in that area. 21. Lack of selectivity also limited a program’s realism. For example, the program in Ukraine (FY04-07) was set up to support all seven of the country’s development pillars, and in Cambodia (FY00-03), the program was too broad, placing heavy demands on limited field-based staff and spreading resources too thin. Figure C. 3 summarizes the frequencies of each of these characteristics among the 65 country programs with low realism ratings. Figure C.3. An Overestimation of Capacity Was the Most Frequent Shortcoming of Unrealistic Programs Flexibility 22. In 57 programs—roughly two-thirds of those where a judgment could be made— flexibility in responding to changes in government demand or changes in country 129
APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK’S COUNTRY PROGRAMS conditions was moderately satisfactory or better. Ratings for flexibility improved over the period, with 73 percent rated moderately satisfactory in the second half of the period, compared to 60 percent in the first half. 23. In Morocco (FY06-08), the Bank responded rapidly to changes in government commitment, priorities, or capacity, scaling up lending and AAA accordingly. In El Salvador (FY05-09), the Bank used a CAS Progress Report to recast its program in response to political gridlock in the first half of the period, scaling back the lending program and associated objectives. The program was still able to make an impact through AAA, project preparation, and the use of alternative funding sources. 24. Other programs responded well to changes in country conditions, including in Sri Lanka (FY03-07) where the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was discarded when the new government pursued military operations and the country was besieged by the 2004 tsunami. A CAS Progress Report narrowed the scope of objectives in the existing pillars and added a new pillar focused on tsunami reconstruction. 25. The 29 programs that were rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse for flexibility fall into three categories. First, in about half of unsatisfactory programs an important change in conditions occurred, but the program was not adjusted in any significant way. This happened in Argentina (FY06-09) where the CAS anticipated a Progress Report at the program’s midpoint, but none was prepared even in the face of the global financial crisis. In addition to major strategic adjustments to the lending program, the Progress Report would have provided an opportunity to rethink the size and composition of the AAA program. Similarly in Benin (FY04-06), the Bank did not revise its program in response to deteriorating external events. Moreover, while risks to the program were well identified in advance, the mitigation measures focused on long-term policies such as diversifying the economy and strengthening incentives. In the event, an infusion of quick-disbursing assistance would have been necessary to appropriately cope with multiple shocks. 26. In other programs where flexibility was rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse, a response to changing conditions came either with significant delay, or was too minor to have a meaningful impact. For example in The Gambia (FY03-07), it emerged quickly that the government lacked the necessary commitment to implement the program. In response, the Bank dropped most of the high case projects from the pipeline, but replaced them with several others. It also introduced portfolio monitoring improvements, but these actions were far from timely. And in Romania (FY06-09), the Bank was slow to recognize and act upon the need to overhaul its strategy when the government felt little need for a Bank program after European Union accession, despite a plan at the outset to carry out a full review in that scenario. 130
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
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CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
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CHAPTER 3 THE PROMISE OF A KNOWLEDG
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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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