The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

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CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS 4.17 Budgetary processes and informal incentives had an impact on the effectiveness of the matrix system. The new budgetary system quickly ran into difficulties because its detailed functioning principles had been left undefined and resulted in variations and sometimes inconsistencies across the Regions. 53 In the first few years the transaction costs were very high. The uncertainty created for large numbers of technical staff members who were concerned about finding effective demand for their services and generated supply-driven behaviors to ensure new tasks. Sector managers felt obliged to find work for their staff rather than allow the labor market to determine demand for different staff members. Organizational culture also played a major role in undermining the incentives to use global knowledge through increased cooperation among sectors and across Regions: defensive “turf” behaviors developed quickly and persist today, particularly among sector units with overlapping mandates. The poor performance of Sector Boards is partly attributable to such behaviors, as well as to the excessively large span of control of sector managers. 4.18 External effects also had an impact on the matrix system. Just when the matrix system was being introduced, the onset of the Asian financial crisis created an unanticipated increase in demand for quick-disbursing loans, which distracted management’s attention away from the Knowledge Bank that was to offset the lending culture at precisely the same time that new incentives and processes were to be put in place to support the matrix structure. The growing importance of GPGs and the expanded external role of the networks in the new international aid architecture and growing corporate demands, which are unrelated to the internal matrix management of country and sector units, also had an impact on the matrix by diverting the attention of the network anchors. INCENTIVES ARISING FROM THE METRICS OF SUCCESS 4.19 The matrix system was expected to reduce the emphasis on lending volume as the metric of success, but has not succeeding in doing so. The long-standing “lending culture” continues to privilege Board approval of lending operations and disbursement ratios over results in client countries. The Bank monitors and reports regularly on lending commitments, and supervision reports track disbursements closely, sending a signal that volume rather than quality is the measure of success. On knowledge products, the Bank tracks the number of ESW and technical assistance deliveries and the resources expended on them. It was only in FY11 that the Bank introduced a Corporate Scorecard and a message from the president announced that the World Bank was embarking on “the next phase of the results agenda” (President’s End-of-Year Message, July 1, 2011). Even so, that commitment 67
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES to results was followed immediately by a list of the volume of commitments and investments by each arm of the World Bank Group. The priority given to lending (while not new) and the numeric count of knowledge products rather than results generate incentives for management and staff that can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Managing for Quality under the Matrix System QUALITY UNDER THE MATRIX SYSTEM 4.20 The matrix system was expected to simplify review processes with clear responsibilities for quality. The design of the matrix system had envisaged dual responsibility: the articulation of client demand was the responsibility of country management, while primary responsibility for quality rested with the managers of sector units. Quality was to be ensured through a simplified, two-stage review process for project appraisals, supplemented by independent reviews by QAG to provide third-party feedback to senior management on the quality of the portfolio. In practice, additional formal and informal quality control functions have been added to the “simplified review process.” Sector managers interviewed for this evaluation consider these multiple roles, incentives, and accountabilities to be “absolutely inconsistent with the official [matrix] arrangements.” 4.21 The matrix systems’ aim to improve quality has been undermined by the growing number of quality assurance layers in different units—sector units, regional OS units, and CMUs—with a growing emphasis on operational risks that could damage the Bank’s reputation, with relatively less attention to other aspects of quality and development impact. CMUs were originally expected to rely on quality assurance systems established at the regional level and the sector level. Over time, they have hired operational advisers and other operational staff in the CMUs, adding another layer of clearance and quality control. The country directors’ role in quality assurance receives mixed appreciation. While some sector managers who were interviewed view their role and the additional layers of control they have introduced as helpful, others find them both misplaced and redundant. “Two sets of eyes (in the CMU and the SMU) looking at the portfolio are better than just one. It is good to have the CMU also look over quality.” But also, “I am accountable for quality but the CMUs have also started doing technical reviews through their own quality assurance systems because accountabilities are not clear and they want to protect themselves.” 54 Moreover, the quality improvements from these additional layers often consist of safeguarding against risk or presentational changes in project documents rather than substantive changes in project design. 68
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
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APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
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APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
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APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
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Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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