The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

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4. Delivering Quality Services Highlights Although outcomes of Bank-financed operations improved significantly over the past two decades, there has been a significant decline in outcome ratings since FY06. Quality assurance systems are more effective for lending than for ESW and are weakest for NLTA. The focus on reputational risk has crowded out attention to other aspects of quality of lending operations. Accountability for quality is highest for task team leaders and nonexistent for sector directors. Regional sector units, responsible for operational delivery, are receiving a decreasing share of regional budgets. Messages from senior management, control over task budgets, and desires for promotion and salary increase are the primary incentives for meeting lending targets. Job satisfaction and recognition by peers are the primary incentives for “matrix behaviors” designed to improve development outcomes, including focusing on results, collaborating across sectors, and mobilizing Bank-wide expertise. Disincentives arising out of budgetary and information management rules discourage cross-sector collaboration. Introduction 4.1 The matrix system was designed to strengthen the Bank’s ability to deliver quality services that combine relevant local solutions with global knowledge. This was to be achieved by the combination of country priorities articulated by country management and global technical expertise brought to bear by sector management and the Bank-wide networks. 4.2 The key question this chapter seeks to answer is “Are incentives and accountability mechanisms aligned in a manner that rewards high quality in client services and results?” To answer this question, the evaluation assesses the extent to which: incentives and accountabilities are clearly defined to assure quality. financing and budget incentives influence the quality of outputs and promote effective knowledge and technical services. 61
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES the matrix system fosters cross-sector collaboration and teamwork to achieve results. 4.3 The evaluation has looked at both formal and informal incentives in recent years to assess the effectiveness of the matrix system. Improving quality in portfolio performance and encouraging greater cross-sector work were objectives of the 1997 reforms. This chapter briefly discusses the role of formal and informal incentives for quality and client orientation and their links to institutional arrangements. It then presents an overview of recent trends in portfolio outcomes to assess if there have been any changes in quality and in the patterns of sector and thematic distribution of the portfolio. The chapter then focuses on incentives, drawing on data from survey results and manager interviews as well as analysis of budgetary incentives. The chapter then presents a brief review of quality assurance mechanisms and accountabilities for results. Based on these findings, the evaluation draws conclusions regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the matrix system in achieving the related intermediate outcome—“Incentives and accountability ensure teamwork and high quality country dialogue and client services.” PORTFOLIO TRENDS IN QUALITY 4.4 Outcomes of Bank-financed operations as measured by year of exit from the portfolio improved significantly over the past two decades, rising from less than two-thirds satisfactory in the early 1990s to a peak of nearly 80 percent satisfactory in the mid-2000s, as shown in Error! Reference source not found. Figure 4.1a. Reporting outcomes by year of exit is a lagging indicator of quality at entry, reflecting performance of projects prepared an average of seven years earlier and affected in part by Bank supervision. Of the lending operations exiting the portfolio in FY01-10, 76 percent of operations were rated moderately satisfactory or better, compared to 68 percent for those exiting in FY1991-2000, a difference that is statistically significant. 4.5 In more recent years, quality has become a concern. After the long upward trend in outcomes, the trend has turned decidedly negative. The share of Banksupported operations exiting the portfolio in FY08-10 whose outcomes were moderately satisfactory or better was 74 percent, compared to 79 percent in FY05-07, a decline that is statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. 51 This decline is more evident for investment projects, which are typically prepared six to seven years earlier, than for development policy operations. Indeed, partial results for FY10 52 were the worst in an individual year since FY99 (although year-to-year variations should be interpreted with caution). This suggests that the Bank’s quality assurance system deserves a closer look. 62
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The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
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©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
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Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
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Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
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Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
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Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
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GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
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Overview The Matrix System at Work
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OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
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OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
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OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
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OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
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OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
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OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
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OVERVIEW management structure but t
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OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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Appendix A Matrix Management and Or
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APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
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APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
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APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
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APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
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Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
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APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
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Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
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# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
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Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
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APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
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Appendix H Working across Organizat
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APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
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Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
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APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
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APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
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Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
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Appendix L International Finance Co
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APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
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APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
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Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
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References Barnett, Michael N. and
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REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
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Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
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ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
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ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
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ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
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