The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES reviewers are heavily tilted toward fiduciary and safeguards issues, which are managed by their own unit. It is telling that staff and managers complain about the excessive focus on fiduciary and safeguard matters and relative inattention to other aspects of quality in regional review processes. QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED 4.35 In line with the recently observed decline in development outcomes, most managers believe the quality of the portfolio has not improved since the introduction of the matrix system. Half of the sector managers and country directors/managers interviewed for this evaluation said that quality of lending and AAA is not significantly better than during the pre-matrix period, possibly reflecting recent pressures on quality. Among the remaining managers interviewed, more think quality has worsened, particularly for AAA, rather than improved. This may be a reflection of the growing volume of NLTA, which has had weaker quality review procedures than ESW. The majority of staff whose Bank careers began prior to the matrix system also do not report a noticeable improvement in the quality of supervision and AAA, while 39 percent feel it has worsened. While these perceived changes may not be due to the matrix reforms, at the very least it indicates that quality assurance systems are under strain and have not prevented quality deterioration, particularly in recent years. 4.36 Available tools for quality enhancement are not being used effectively by sector units. The two main tools available to sector units are independent peer reviews and QERs. Sector managers value QERs much more than peer reviews for improving quality. Peer reviews in regional operations are not well managed. For the most part, task team leaders select their own peer reviewers, sometimes even from their own unit. In contrast, peer reviewers in DEC and IEG are selected by managers to ensure high quality and global expertise. In regional operations, due to delivery deadlines, peer reviewers are aware that substantive criticisms at the decision meeting or at meetings of the Operations Committee—where operations receive internal approval to move forward with appraisal and to request Board approval—are neither welcomed nor likely to be addressed. QERs have the potential to be more effective because they are considered a nonthreatening venue to obtain high-quality technical advice. But they are now considered optional, they are often undertaken too late, and their use is uneven across Regions and sectors. More systematic and timely use of QERs would significantly enhance quality of lending operations. 4.37 The potential of the matrix is not being fully exploited to enhance operational quality. In most Regions, the concept review meetings—where teams are authorized to prepare an operation—and decision meetings for investment projects 73
CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES and ESW are chaired by the country director. Development Policy Loan (DPL) review meetings are held at the Regional Operations Committee or Bank-wide Operations Committee. Only in East Asia and the Pacific have both sides of the regional matrix been involved: the country director chaired the concept review meeting to ensure strategic relevance and client demand for the lending or nonlending product, and the sector director chaired the decision meeting to ensure quality. This good practice could easily be replicated in other Regions but ironically, to harmonize procedures across Regions, it has been done away with, as of July 2011. Staff Incentives THE SYSTEM OF FORMAL INCENTIVES 4.38 The primary set of formal staff incentives at the Bank—performance management, rewards and recognition, and career progression—are not aligned with the Bank’s primary objective, to achieve development results in client countries. While these formal incentives are not the only means by which staff are motivated, they do have some influence and serve as an important benchmark regarding which behaviors the institution values. This evaluation does not directly assess the HR system of the Bank—that is a task for future evaluations—but rather identifies areas where incentive systems set by HR policies and practices affect the functioning of the matrix system. 4.39 The Bank’s performance management system is not tailored to the unique circumstances of the Bank’s work, but rather it is based entirely on individual results agreements between staff members and their managers. In the absence of any specified guidance on linking individual efforts to higher-order organizational objectives—such as sharing knowledge across organizational units, collaborating across sectors, focusing on development outcomes of lending operations, and focusing on dissemination, use, and impact of AAA—managers are free to orient performance assessments around the narrower goals of individual units. Moreover, assessments do not hold staff accountable for longer-term results of work from previous years. By contrast, indicators for assessment of performance in IFC are based on objective criteria and are linked to IFC’s core objectives. Rewards are based on individual and team-based performance, project delivery, longer-term project and portfolio outcomes, and knowledge sharing. IFC also has a system of more rapid promotions enabled by a higher number of grade levels for professionals and staff than at the World Bank (see Box 5.3 and Appendix L). 4.40 Opportunities for promotion are infrequent, and rewards are inadequate. The grouping of professional grades into large bands means that some of the best 74
Page 1 and 2:
The Matrix System at Work An Evalua
Page 3 and 4:
©2012 Independent Evaluation Group
Page 5 and 6:
Costs of Country and Sector Strateg
Page 7 and 8:
Table 3.6. Total Cross-Support Sold
Page 10:
Abbreviations AAA AFR ARDE ARPP BET
Page 14 and 15:
Glossary Term Anchor sector directo
Page 16 and 17:
GLOSSARY Practice managers (PM) Reg
Page 18 and 19:
Overview The Matrix System at Work
Page 20 and 21:
OVERVIEW rather than on the 1997 ma
Page 22 and 23:
OVERVIEW satisfactory or better in
Page 24 and 25:
OVERVIEW toward capacity building a
Page 26 and 27:
OVERVIEW Innovation in the field is
Page 28 and 29:
OVERVIEW Figure D. Outcomes of Bank
Page 30 and 31:
OVERVIEW modernization in the corpo
Page 32 and 33:
OVERVIEW management structure but t
Page 34 and 35:
OVERVIEW Structure Bank-wide matrix
Page 36 and 37:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE interest and ow
Page 38 and 39:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Management cons
Page 40:
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE that reach far
Page 43 and 44:
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
2. The Strategic Alignment of Secto
Page 61 and 62:
CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER 2 THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT O
Page 79 and 80: CHAPTER 3 THE PROMISE OF A KNOWLEDG
Page 103 and 104: CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
Page 113: CHAPTER 4 DELIVERING QUALITY SERVIC
Page 123 and 124: CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND
Page 145 and 146: 6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 147 and 148: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND
Page 149 and 150: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND
Page 152 and 153: Appendix A Matrix Management and Or
Page 154 and 155: APPENDIX A MATRIX MANAGEMENT AND OR
Page 162 and 163: SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF CASCR REVIEWS
Page 164 and 165:
APPENDIX B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a
Page 166 and 167:
APPENDIX C RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFEC
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
APPENDIX D EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCH
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Appendix E Key Findings from Sector
Page 198 and 199:
APPENDIX E KEY FINDINGS FROM SECTOR
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Table E.1. Country Directors and Ma
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
# Other Questions Q # 7 APPENDIX E
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
Page 216 and 217:
APPENDIX F FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:
Page 218 and 219:
Appendix G Comparison of the Six Re
Page 220 and 221:
APPENDIX G PROFILES OF THE BANK’S
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Appendix H Working across Organizat
Page 228 and 229:
APPENDIX H WORKING ACROSS ORGANIZAT
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Appendix I Budgetary Incentives 65.
Page 240 and 241:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Bud
Page 242 and 243:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES 72.
Page 244 and 245:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES com
Page 246 and 247:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES Fig
Page 248 and 249:
APPENDIX I BUDGETARY INCENTIVES mea
Page 250 and 251:
APPENDIX J WORKING ACROSS SECTORS A
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Appendix K World Bank Sector Strate
Page 258 and 259:
APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
Page 260 and 261:
APPENDIX K WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATE
Page 262 and 263:
Appendix L International Finance Co
Page 264 and 265:
APPENDIX L IFC 2013 CHANGE INITIATI
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Note: Head
Page 272 and 273:
APPENDIX M STAFFING DATA Table M.7.
Page 274 and 275:
Appendix N Managers Interviewed Nam
Page 276 and 277:
References Barnett, Michael N. and
Page 278 and 279:
REFERENCES Sy, Thomas and Laura Sue
Page 280 and 281:
Endnotes 1 See Wapenhans 1992, 1994
Page 282 and 283:
ENDNOTES appropriately assessed by
Page 284 and 285:
ENDNOTES 46 The respondents to this
Page 286:
ENDNOTES 71 See Safeguards and Sust
show all

The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?