The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
The Matrix System at Work - Independent Evaluation Group - World ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
APPENDIX D<br />
EXPERIENCE IN THE TRENCHES: RESULTS FROM THE STAFF SURVEY<br />
recognition by peers. Messages from senior management and desire for promotion<br />
were the weakest incentives for collabor<strong>at</strong>ing across sectors (with substantial<br />
influence for 25 percent and 28 percent, respectively), mobilizing Bank-wide<br />
technical expertise (19 percent, 20 percent), and adapting knowledge to country<br />
needs (19 percent, 20 percent). Non-organiz<strong>at</strong>ional factors were far more influential<br />
in this regard: job s<strong>at</strong>isfaction was substantially influential for 71 percent of sector<br />
and anchor staff in driving collabor<strong>at</strong>ion across sectors, for 60 percent in driving<br />
mobiliz<strong>at</strong>ion of Bank-wide technical expertise, and for 62 percent in driving<br />
adapt<strong>at</strong>ion of knowledge to country needs. <strong>The</strong> next most common incentive for<br />
these behaviors was peer recognition.<br />
ACCOUNTABILITY: ONLY THE TASK TEAM LEADER (TTL) IS SEEN BY A MAJORITY TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY<br />
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE RESULTS OF LENDING OPERATIONS; NO INDIVIDUAL IS SEEN AS SUBSTANTIALLY<br />
ACCOUNTABLE FOR ESW.<br />
39. Staff indic<strong>at</strong>ed a gre<strong>at</strong>er degree of accountability of TTLs for results of lending<br />
oper<strong>at</strong>ions than of sector managers and country directors/manager: TTLs were<br />
accountable to a substantial or very large extent according to 52 percent of staff,<br />
while 35 percent and 34 percent of staff <strong>at</strong>tributed substantial accountability to<br />
sector managers and country directors/managers, respectively. Staff graded <strong>at</strong> the<br />
H-level were least likely to <strong>at</strong>tribute accountability to managers and directors.<br />
40. Few staff think anyone is substantially accountable for ESW. Thirty-six percent<br />
of staff <strong>at</strong>tributed substantial accountability to TTLs for dissemin<strong>at</strong>ion of ESW<br />
products, compared to 22 percent to sector managers and 17 percent to country<br />
directors/managers for impacts of ESW on projects or policy.<br />
41. Accountability for results of lending oper<strong>at</strong>ions are strongest in East Asia and the<br />
Pacific, where more than two-thirds (69 percent) consider the TTL substantially<br />
accountable for results of lending and half consider sector managers and country<br />
directors/managers accountable. Accountability is weakest in L<strong>at</strong>in America and the<br />
Caribbean, where the same figures are 49 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent<br />
respectively (only staff from the Middle East and North Africa judge TTLs to be less<br />
accountable for lending with 35 percent considering them substantially so). Similarly,<br />
staff in L<strong>at</strong>in America and the Caribbean rarely view anyone substantially<br />
accountable for dissemin<strong>at</strong>ion or impact of ESW—the analogous figures for TTLs,<br />
sector managers, and country directors/managers are 28 percent, 10 percent, and 10<br />
percent.<br />
42. Staff based in Washington are less likely to view sector managers or country<br />
directors/managers as accountable for results. About a quarter (27 percent) of<br />
headquarter-based staff consider sector managers substantially accountable for results<br />
of lending oper<strong>at</strong>ions, compared to 47 percent of field-based staff. <strong>The</strong> figures for<br />
country director accountability are 28 percent and 44 percent. And only 10 percent of<br />
141