11.07.2015 Views

U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy - Joint Ocean Commission Initiative

U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy - Joint Ocean Commission Initiative

U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy - Joint Ocean Commission Initiative

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

The federal governmentshould eliminatesubsidies andincentives for developmentand redevelopmentin coastalhigh hazard, floodand erosi<strong>on</strong> areas.This is a matter ofprudent fiscal andemergency managementas much asenvir<strong>on</strong>mentalprotecti<strong>on</strong>.—Jane Stahl, Deputy<str<strong>on</strong>g>Commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>er of Envir<strong>on</strong>mentalProtecti<strong>on</strong>,State of C<strong>on</strong>necticut,testim<strong>on</strong>y to the<str<strong>on</strong>g>Commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>, July 2002financial resources to move or elevate the home. 10 Absent this designati<strong>on</strong>, many of theseproperties have been rebuilt in place, leading to repeated claims. Although <strong>on</strong>ly 2 percentof NFIP covered properties have received repetitive-loss payments, they account for 40percent of overall NFIP payments, many at cumulative totals exceeding the property’svalue. Although a nati<strong>on</strong>al problem, between 1978 and 1995, Louisiana and Texasaccounted for $1.1 billi<strong>on</strong>, or 40 percent of the $2.75 billi<strong>on</strong> in total repetitive-loss claimspaid by the NFIP. 11Approximately 90 percent of repetitive-loss payments are for buildings that predate NFIPmaps. 12 This dem<strong>on</strong>strates the effectiveness and success of NFIP building standards for newc<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> in flood-pr<strong>on</strong>e areas, but also underscores the program’s lack of authority forreducing the vulnerability of older buildings. Many property owners underestimate their risk,resist investments in structural improvements that do not directly translate into higher homeprices, and then rely <strong>on</strong> federal disaster assistance as a fallback when floods occur. For someproperties, the most acceptable and ec<strong>on</strong>omical soluti<strong>on</strong> for all c<strong>on</strong>cerned will be voluntarybuyouts at prices that allow property owners to relocate out of harm’s way.Eliminating Incentives for Development in Floodplains and Eroding AreasThe NFIP was created both as a more desirable alternative to federal disaster relief in thewake of flooding and as a tool to guide development away from flood pr<strong>on</strong>e areas throughstate and local floodplain management. However, of the 6.6 milli<strong>on</strong> buildings located in the100-year floodplains of participating communities, more than a third were built after theNFIP maps were created and floodplain management requirements imposed. 13 As <strong>on</strong>e ofthe federal government’s principal tools for influencing development in high-hazard areas,the NFIP’s risk assessment, mitigati<strong>on</strong>, and insurance comp<strong>on</strong>ents should be revamped tobetter achieve the original goal of discouraging communities from building in harm’s way.Recommendati<strong>on</strong> 10–3The Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Ocean</strong> Council should recommend changes in the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Flood InsuranceProgram (NFIP) to reduce incentives for development in high-hazard areas.Specifically, NFIP changes should:• establish clear disincentives to building or rebuilding in coastal high-hazard z<strong>on</strong>es by requiringproperty owners at risk of erosi<strong>on</strong> to pay actuarially sound rates for insurance.• enforce measures that reduce vulnerability to natural hazards, including assistance inretrofitting older structures and buyout programs for susceptible structures with repetitive-losshistories.• create enforceable mechanisms to direct development away from undeveloped floodplainsand erosi<strong>on</strong> z<strong>on</strong>es.Hazards Mitigati<strong>on</strong> PlanningHazards mitigati<strong>on</strong> planning—the process of assessing potential hazards and evaluatingand identifying acti<strong>on</strong>s to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities—has been required of statesfor nearly two decades as a c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of receiving disaster relief and other FEMA funding.However, the quality of those plans, and the degree to which they are based <strong>on</strong> a soundprocess with adequate stakeholder involvement, vary widely. Major disaster losses in the1990s led FEMA to increase its attenti<strong>on</strong> to hazards mitigati<strong>on</strong> planning, establishing aunit dedicated to that purpose in 1998.C<strong>on</strong>gress also recognized that deficiencies in mitigati<strong>on</strong> planning prevented the mosteffective use of disaster assistance funds. Communities recovering from disasters receivelittle guidance during the rebuilding process to improve their resilience to future disasters.In the Disaster Mitigati<strong>on</strong> Act, passed in 2000, C<strong>on</strong>gress directed FEMA to impose morestringent mitigati<strong>on</strong> planning requirements <strong>on</strong> states. States that fail to meet FEMA’s newcriteria can be denied disaster assistance and some other types of funding, while states168 A N O CEAN B LUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST C ENTURY

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!