GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

Among the reasons for NASA’s decision to make Stanford the prime contractor on GP-B were the following:1. The payload and spacecraft were intimately interdependent. That is, the payload sensor was the keycontrol element to the space vehicle system. One of the four science gyros was also used as the drag-freesensor, and the helium gas escaping from the dewar was used by proportional micro-thrusters tomaintain drag-free and attitude control. The total-system mass center location was also critical.2. The development process and specification derivation were integrated. Because the payload drove mostof the spacecraft requirements, the specifications were linked. They were developed together and verifiedin an integrated fashion.3. Many of the technologies associated with the science Instrument Assembly—namely, the gyroscopes andtheir suspension systems, the SQUIDs, and the pointing telescope—were entirely new and uniquetechnologies that could only have been developed in a very advanced academic research environment.4. The Science Instrument Assembly had to be integrated into the probe, the probe was then integrated intothe dewar, and finally, the dewar-probe unit was integrated into the spacecraft, so that all of thesecomponents functioned together as a unified system. This total integration of payload and spacecraft wascrucial to the success of the mission.5. The scientists and engineers at Stanford understood points 1-4 above, and they were the logical peopleable to oversee the technical trade-offs associated with designing and constructing this unique spacecraft.In November 1984, following a by-the-book competitive bidding process, Stanford selected Lockheed Martin tobuild the flight dewar and probe that would house the Science Instrument Assembly, the heart of theexperiment being developed and constructed at Stanford. GP-B then sent MSFC/NASA Headquarters aproposal, with Stanford as the prime contractor and LM as Stanford's subcontractor, for implementing therestructured flight plan and building the required flight hardware. In 1985, MSFC/NASA Headquartersaccepted the Stanford-Lockheed Martin STORE proposal and funded this technology development plan. Thefact that the technology plan included LM as Stanford's industry subcontractor represented a significantincrease in management responsibility for Stanford. However, under Parkinson's experience and leadership,Stanford was prepared for this challenge, and “The Management Experiment” commenced.6.3 Flight Hardware Development (1984-1997)James Beggs, the NASA Administrator in 1985, concurred with Samuel Keller's decision to make Stanford thePrime Contractor on GP-B, and he remarked that in addition to being a physics experiment that needed to becarried out in space, GP-B was equally interesting as a “management experiment.”As stated in the Calder-Jones Report to NASA, page 7:The Management Experiment was an agreement between NASA Headquarters, NASAMSFC, and Stanford University that established Stanford as the prime contractor, managingthe entire program with minimal NASA oversight. The decision followed a recommendationfrom the Space Studies Board (SSB) to NASA Headquarters in mid-1983, after the SSB hadreviewed the MSFC Phase B Study. The view of the SSB, endorsed by NASA Headquarters,was that in a mission such as GP-B where the instrument and spacecraft are much moreclosely integrated than in typical space programs, separating the two would be gravelydetrimental. It was predicated on Stanford University's agreeing to set up a much strongermanagement structure than is typical in universities.The flight hardware development period continued for about 15 years, at which time it became necessary totransition GP-B from a research and development program with minimal NASA oversight to a classical NASAflight program that would culminate in a successful launch, on-orbit operations, and subsequent data analysis,leading to the determination of the experimental results.Gravity Probe B — Post Flight Analysis • Final Report March 2007 149