GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

Below is an edited summary of six areas of the GP-B Management Experiment, described on page 24 of theCalder-Jones Report, from which NASA can glean some lessons for management of other missions. The fullreport includes a more complete discussion of these six management areas.16.3.1 Working With Organizational AsymmetriesEach of the institutions involved in the development of GP-B—a research university, an aerospace company,and NASA—have different strengths and different cultures. These entities should be managed to leverage theirunique strengths in a team context, while respecting their cultural differences. In a university environment, thegoal is typically knowledge-driven; a university researcher will pursue a problem until it has been solved…nomatter how long it takes. In aerospace companies, schedule and budget are typically the important managementfactors; product development is always constrained by time and budget, and this often leads to trade-offs. AtNASA, risk management is often of greatest concern. The management lesson for a program like GP-B is theimportance of leveraging these asymmetries to best advantage. For example, unique hardware such as the GSScould only be developed in a university environment, whereas more common flight hardware that resides onthe critical path for a satellite launch—e.g. the Gas Management Assembly on the GP-B spacecraft—is bestdeveloped by a knowledgeable and experienced aerospace company.16.3.2 Recognizing and Managing Critical Transition PointsAll NASA program progress through various stages or transitions where management requirements and stylesneed to change and/or adapt. Recognizing and planning for these transitional periods ahead of time cansignificantly streamline the program development process. This may include planning ahead for a managementchange at future transition point. For example, a program like GP-B was bound to reach a point where it wasnecessary to transition from an R&D program to a tightly-scheduled, minimal risk flight program. Planning forthis transition ahead of time, including anticipated management changes from an R&D-oriented programmanager to an aerospace-operations-oriented program manager, can facilitate making this transition moresmoothly.16.3.3 Adaptive Program Management.This is a corollary to Lesson #2 above. It is important to recognize that management styles and competenciesmust adapt as a program progresses through different stages in its life cycle. For example, in the case of GP-B,the operations management skills of Gaylord Green, which were very well suited for the flight program, wereless germane when the program transitioned to the data analysis phase. GP-B senior management adapted tothis phase shift in the program by changing program managers.16.3.4 Maintaining Aerospace Knowledge at UniversitiesUniversities working on NASA programs need to acquire some degree of institutionalized aerospace systemknowledge—that is, procedures, best practices, and lessons learned that have evolved in the aerospace industryand in government agencies from developing, launching, and operating spacecraft for over 50 years. This typeof knowledge is essential to the success of any NASA mission, regardless of management structure, and whenapplied appropriately, it can reduce risk and facilitate progress. However, if such knowledge is applied by rote,without proper contextual forethought, it can actually impair progress. By definition, this type of knowledge isexperiential, rather than academic; it cannot be taught in a classroom, but rather it must be learned in theprocess of actually building flight hardware and software. For this reason, once staff and/or students have beenthrough the process of building flight hardware or working on a spacecraft, it behooves NASA and universitiesto value these trained individuals as an investment for future aerospace programs, rather than as sunk costs fora single project.458 March 2007 Chapter 16 — Lessons Learned and Best Practices