GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

astrophysics/cosmology. Many of the committee members were associated with other NASA missions related toGP-B. Clifford Will, a world-renowned expert in relativity and gravitational physics, was invited to chair thiscommittee. The purpose of the SAC was to review and advise the GP-B management team on all aspects of themission, including the functioning of the probe and spacecraft, possible sources of error, as well as the final dataanalysis. As of the time this chapter was written, the SAC has met 16 times and is scheduled to meet again late in2007 to review the final experimental data analysis and results.Even before the Probe C thermal disconnect problem, it had become apparent that the GP-B launch date wouldneed to be pushed back. The discovery of the Probe C thermal problem and the pickup loop problem with gyro#4 in mid-1999 increased NASA’s concern about the program’s viability. As a result, Dan Golden, then theNASA Administrator, commissioned an independent review team (IRT) comprised of outside scientists andaerospace experts to examine the progress that had been made on the program to date, and to advise NASA as towhether the mission should be terminated or continue to proceed towards launch. GP-B senior managementsuccessfully defended the program, but there was an issue with the program funding. Because of budgetconstraints, NASA was unable to honor GP-B’s level-funding plan. (See Section 6.3.4, NASA Funds GP-B as aFlight Program.) Consequently, the program was never able to increase the electronics and spacecraftdevelopment efforts to desired levels, and the result was further delays in the completion of those systems.At the beginning of 2000, Stanford and Lockheed Martin management prepared a plan, including a revised timeline and budget, for addressing the issues with Probe C and gyro #4 and for moving GP-B to the launch pad. Thefollowing month, Golden, convened another top-level review of GP-B at NASA Headquarters. Everitt,Parkinson, Buchman and other senior management from Stanford, as well as senior management from LM andMSFC were all present at this meeting. At this point, NASA's main concern was the viability of the GP-Bmission, minimizing of risk, and constraining the remaining time and cost of completing the mission. Onceagain, Everitt, Parkinson, and Buchman prevailed, and GP-B was given a green light to proceed, with launchnow anticipated in May 2002. However, at this point, Ed Weiler, the head of the Science Mission Directorate atNASA Headquarters, under which GP-B was managed and funded, placed full responsibility for the successfullaunch and completion of the GP-B mission in the hands of Arthur Stephenson, then the Director of MSFC.Stephenson interpreted this directive as meaning that a team of MSFC managers, scientists, and engineers, ledby Geveden, needed to get actively involved in the day-to-day activities of GP-B.Thus began a difficult two-year period from 2000-2002, during which the three entities involved—MSFC,Stanford, and LM—had to figure out how to communicate and work together effectively and harmoniously.Each of these entities had its own “culture” and ways of doing things that were successful for each entityrespectively. These differences were an advantage in the early stages of the program when innovation andtechnology development were most important. However, in the focused environment of meeting a launchschedule while trying to minimize the risk of failure, these three divergent cultures collided. For example, theStanford scientists and engineers, who excelled at innovating technology, were unaccustomed to the rigorous,methodical, procedural nature of the aerospace industry. Likewise, seasoned aerospace managers werefrustrated by the tendency of university researchers to continue tinkering with and perfecting technologies pasta stage that would be “good enough” to meet necessary milestones in a tight schedule.In addition to the differences in culture, the Stanford management team, particularly with Parkinson’s reducedinvolvement after 1998, had little collective experience with the intricacies of launching a satellite. At this stagein the program, they often needed help from NASA and from LM. The issue was that Stanford needed to learnhow and when to request help from MSFC and LM. Likewise, MSFC, in particular, needed to learn when andhow best to respond to such requests.Furthermore, unlike the Chandra Telescope mission in which MSFC was actively involved in every step of thedesign and development, MSFC scientists and engineers had minimal involvement in the development of GP-Bhardware and technology, since most of the development was done at Stanford and Lockheed Martin, under the160 March 2007 Chapter 6 — The GP-B Management Experiment