GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

supervision of the Stanford GP-B management team. Thus, when Stephenson and Geveden began sendingteams of NASA personnel to Stanford to support the program, this proved to be problematic. As stated in theCalder-Jones Report, page 33:…The Stanford and Lockheed Martin teams were unprepared for this influx from NASA andinitially it slowed GP-B's progress even further. Engineers and scientists were now not onlyattempting to solve their own technical issues but were being forced to meet, brief, and reporttheir activities at a level [of detail] far beyond what they were accustomed to....The situation was also frustrating for the MSFC engineers, who originally felt that they had a mandate fromStephenson to gain as much insight into GP-B as they had with Chandra. Eventually Stephenson clarified thatwhile he recognized that Chandra-level insight was not possible, he still wanted MSFC to have an appropriatelevel of insight, and he directed Geveden to find a more productive solution. It fell to Lead Systems EngineerBuddy Randolph to devise a risk-based oversight system, based on a risk management system and a 5-levelinsight system developed by the MSFC Engineering Directorate.Other factors served to improve the working relationships, including the constant efforts of Resident ManagerEd Ingraham, a communications plan negotiated and signed by Geveden, Buchman, and Hugh Dougherty (LMProgram Manager), additional systems engineering personnel brought in by LM, and efforts by Stanfordpersonnel, in many cases with LM support, to adopt such NASA and industry practices as risk managementsystems, fault tree analyses, and requirements verification. Others who contributed significantly to these effortsincluded LM Lead Systems Engineer Bob Schultz, LM systems Engineer Rich Whelan, and MSFC systemsengineer Brian Mulac.The Space Vehicle Acceptance Review (SVAR) in June 2003 was a significant, and much-improved, contrast tothe Payload Acceptance Review (PAR). While the PAR issues took a long time to close (almost until the SVAR,in some cases), the noticeably-fewer SVAR issues closed within weeks. The entire team had clearly stepped up tothe job of getting the space vehicle ready for transport to Vandenberg AFB for launch.Unfortunately, in late 2003 there was a need for one last launch delay, to April 2004. This meant one morereview with NASA Headquarters to establish a new launch date. The competence of the Stanford-LM-MSFCteam clearly showed, with convincing and viable plan being presented to NASA managers. The result was asmooth, non-controversial review that established April 17 as the target launch date. The GP-B teamsuccessfully held to this schedule throughout the pre-launch processing until launch vehicle delays moved thelaunch to April 20. (See Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 for further discussion of this launch delay.)In July 2002, Geveden became Deputy Director of the MSFC Science Directorate, and in July 2003, he becameDeputy Director of MSFC, but he remained Program Manager for GP-B through August 2004, when GP-Bcompleted its Initialization and Orbit Checkout (IOC) phase. In October 2004, Geveden moved from MSFC toNASA Headquarters to become the NASA Chief Engineer, and in August 2005, he was promoted to the positionof NASA Associate Administrator. In September 2004, Tony Lyons became Program Manager for GP-B, aposition which he still holds. Arthur Stephenson stepped down as Director of MSFC in May 2003, and hesubsequently retired from NASA in January 2004.Pictured in Figure 6-10 below are eight persons as MSFC who guided and/or supported the GP-B program since1965, including: Rudolph Decher (1965-2004), Richard Potter (1971-1996), Joyce Neighbors (1981-1993), ReinIse (1985-1996), Steve Richards (1990-1995), Rex Geveden (1995-2004), Tony Lyons (1998-Present), and MSFCDirector, Arthur Stephenson (1998-2003).Gravity Probe B — Post Flight Analysis • Final Report March 2007 161