GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

Figure 6-9. The Lockheed Martin GP-B Spacecraft Development Team circa 1995. Key managers from LMincluded: Norman Bennett, Hugh Dougherty, Bill Reeve, Robert Schultz, and Jeff Vanden Beukel.6.3.4 NASA Funds GP-B as a Flight ProgramBy 1994, all of the pieces of a GP-B flight mission were at last coming together: flight-ready prototyping of thegyros, analog gyro suspension system, and gyro readout system at Stanford, development of the flight dewar andprobe at LM, and the competitive selection of LM to construct the space vehicle. During this time period,extensive exchanges took place between NASA/MSFC, NASA HQ and Stanford as to the most appropriatemethod of going forward. An earlier decision (1993) by the then Associate Administrator of the Office of SpaceSciences and Applications (OSSA) led to an unusual funding arrangement. In contrast to the standard NASAfunding profile for flight programs, where there is a substantial increase in annual budget during the two orthree years prior to launch to minimize risk and contingency, GP-B would receive a level funding of $50M/yearwith schedule as contingency. While this was recognized as non-optimal, it was deemed most acceptable optionin the constrained overall OSSA budget plan.Prior analyses, including the independently reviewed FY '95 Program Funding Plan (PFP), had provided for amission with an October 2002 launch and an overall program cost including the launch vehicle, full Phase E andtracking/data costs, and $147.8M already invested for technical development and STORE, amounting to$743.8M. The plan included fabrication of two flight dewars and four dewar probes. The $743.8M was thebottom line figure in the Program Commitment Agreement (PCA) signed August 23, 1994 by the NASAProgram Associate Administrator, the NASA Administrator, and NASA Comptroller. Prior to that (and notedin the PCA), MSFC, the Office of Space Sciences, and Stanford had recommended a de-scoped program,eliminating the Shuttle Test Unit (STU) and cancelling the development of a third flight dewar and a fourthprobe (having deemed that the second dewar and third prototype probe were satisfactory for flight), with atarget launch date of October 2000. By way of 'schedule contingency', an additional 15% (1 year) reserve (i.e. anOctober 2001 launch) was identified to be held at NASA HQ. The total runout costs to October 2001 includingmission operations and data analysis - but excluding the launch vehicle (~$62M), tracking/data (~$20M), and154 March 2007 Chapter 6 — The GP-B Management Experiment