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GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

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16.1.3.2 Training and certification of new flight controllerIssue Summary: <strong>Stanford</strong> University has an excellent source of bright and “Gung Ho” young people to supportthe mission as flight controllers. As capable as these people are, there is no substitute for their preparation.Description of the <strong>GP</strong>-B experience:In fairness to the team, not enough time was allowed for them to be mentored and coached by the spacecraftlead subsystem engineers before these knowledgeable engineers rolled off the program. However, the missioncontrollers did a good job. The training and certification requirements for the initial team was much morestructured and rigorous than it was for the latter team. This not a major concern during this phase since a vastmajority of the high risk commanding and activities have been retired.Lesson:Make sure that the lead subsystem engineers meet at least once weekly for a 3-4 months period for mentoringand information exchange with their <strong>Stanford</strong> replacements. This was implemented at <strong>Stanford</strong> and workedwell.16.2 Selected Best PracticesThe following items were adopted by <strong>GP</strong>-B as “best practices” and we would like to affirm their effectiveness. Inaddition to a broad set of best practices brought forth from the collective wisdom of NASA, Lockheed-Martin,and the <strong>Stanford</strong> teams, these selected best practices are were particularly significant in day-to-day operations:16.2.1 Design team transition to mission operationsIssue Summary: Test and engineering team transition to mission operations ensured ownership.Description of the <strong>GP</strong>-B experience:The <strong>GP</strong>-B development and test teams transitioned to work on the mission operations team after launch. Thisreduced risk of mishaps and improved anomaly resolution efficiency. Expert knowledge was immediatelyavailable to efficiently resolve anomalies. Individuals had strong sense ownership, dedication, and responsibilityfor their components and subsystems.Best Practices:Retain and train design team for mission operations. Encourage a sense of “ownership” and continuity ofresponsibility for all individuals involved in the program. Provide long-term team stability. Take into accountthe conflict of hardware development versus mission operations development and manage it effectively16.2.2 Mission planning flexibilityIssue Summary: Mission planning flexibility provided needed timeline adjustments.Description of the <strong>GP</strong>-B experience:On-orbit anomalies and calibrations required mission planning to be flexible and responsive to changingprogram priorities. The mission operations team was extremely responsive to changes.Best Practices:Mission planning needs to be flexible and responsive to mission needs.454 March 2007 Chapter 16 — Lessons Learned and Best Practices

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