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GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

GP-B Post-Flight Analysis—Final Report - Gravity Probe B - Stanford ...

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16.3.5 Managing RiskIn a program such as <strong>GP</strong>-B, there is no such thing as zero risk. Rather, at any given phase of the program, it isimportant for NASA to determine what level of risk is acceptable and manage program risks accordingly. Thecreation of a formal risk-based management program, such as the one instituted jointly by MSFC, <strong>Stanford</strong>, andLMMS during the latter years of <strong>GP</strong>-B, allowed managers to take a high level look at overall program risks andto monitor the rate at which those risks were changing. This risk management plan included a graphic displaythat was easy to review at a glance, and it also defined a timeline for mitigating risks. Moreover, it providedguidance to NASA for determining the appropriate approach in mitigating program risks. Thus, a predictableprocess was developed whereby NASA support was scaled, based on the level of risk—i.e., the higher the risk themore support imparted by NASA. This not only enabled the <strong>GP</strong>-B team to receive an appropriate amount ofsupport, but it also enabled the team to have reasonable expectations as to the level of support to expect fromNASA for any given issue.16.3.6 Funding PredictabilityTo ensure the health and success of any program, NASA must strive to maintain funding commitments thathave been specified and agreed to. In the case of <strong>GP</strong>-B, NASA's actual level of funding was substantially less thanthe agreed upon funding commitment for the years 1999-2002. Scheduling the development of flight hardwareis intimately tied to expectations regarding available funds. Because funding expectations were not met duringthe critical years leading up to launch, the <strong>GP</strong>-B management team was forced either to unexpectedly cut or torestructure investments in technology development and support activities during this period. In turn, thesetrade-off decisions that were based on insufficient funding ultimately contributed to some of the technical andscheduling problems that emerged near the end of the program.<strong>Gravity</strong> <strong>Probe</strong> B — <strong>Post</strong> <strong>Flight</strong> Analysis • Final <strong>Report</strong> March 2007 459

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