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116 CHAPTER 3among the Kel Adagh where it continued even after the establishment of theMalian state at a moment of internal political change: The succession to Attaherag Illi as the amenokal of the Adagh.This chapter will focus on the administrative and political relations betweenthe Keita regime and the Kel Tamasheq throughout the 1960s. The US-RDA’shigh modernist social economic policies were unrealistic and unwanted, andthey proved to be a failure in the end for more or less the same reasons as theywere a failure elsewhere in the country: Too few material and financial investments,and too much reliance on willpower. But perhaps more so than elsewherein Mali, the patronising attitude of the regime toward the population, informedby existing stereotypical ideas, caused a build-up of tension that wouldin the end form one of the root causes of the rebellion. The regime’s lack ofunderstanding of local work ethics, gender relations, social dynamics, and politicalpower structures led to a wavering policy that was much resented among apopulation bent on preserving the colonial social-political legacy. The KelTamasheq, especially but not only the Kel Adagh, saw the US-RDA policiesand rule as either an unjustified and unwanted meddling in local affairs, or atleast as a discrimination of the Kel Tamasheq over other Malians. This last opinionwas certainly not unfounded. In the Adagh, the international setting furthercomplicated the already tense relation between the Kel Adagh and the Malianadministration. While the Malian regime felt itself surrounded by possible neocolonialadversaries in general, these adversaries were actually present in northMali, where the French Air Force continued to use a military base until 1961while Algerian FLN fighters were located at a training camp right next to them,at the invitation of the Keita regime. This is what the local administrators seemto have feared the most: The active meddling of the French army or the FLN inNorthern Mali, stirring the local population to revolt. The tension was furtherenhanced by the spread of rumours. In a context where a political frame ofreference based on long standing experience with the other is lacking, andwhere most thinking is directed by stereotypical images and uncertainties, rumoursare both an indication of the lack of mutual trust and enhancing distrust.Ruling the NorthThe Keita administration was well aware of its precarious relations with the KelTamasheq. Its initial policies were intended not to disturb the peace and tocreate a more positive image of itself. Politically loaded issues, such as theemancipation of former slaves, were handled with care. Despite the abolishmentof traditional chieftaincies by law, the nomad tribal chiefs were maintained inplace (infra). As far as possible, local administrators were recruited among theKel Tamasheq and the Bidân.

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