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326 EPILOGUEOctober 2004, El Para was handed over to Algeria were he was given a lifesentence. By that time, the US Army had installed itself in the central Sahara,especially in Northern Mali, aiming at the eradication of all possible forms ofMuslim terrorism.US counterterrorism specialists deemed Northern Mali to be a potentiallyexplosive area. The region is poor, smuggling is the greatest pillar of the localeconomy, and firearms abound. The bad reputation of the Kel Tamasheq is notlimited to Mali. Their image as freedom-loving nomads, yet anarchist rebels,has spread to the US as well. Another point of American concern was the supposedlack of state presence and anarchy reigning in the Sahara. The lack ofstrong state institutions, or their inefficiency, was seen as a lack of governmentin the region. However, as I have tried to show throughout this book and in thepages immediately above, this is far more complex than it seemed to the USgovernment. Then there was of course the increase of Islamic activism in theregion. The American military initiatives in Sahel were initially established notso much in response to an actual threat, but according to the idea that it wasimperative to prevent the region from becoming a breeding ground for Muslimterrorism. While not being the only triggering factor, the abduction of touristsby the GSPC was, to the Americans, proof that real danger did hide in theSahara and that therefore their military presence was indispensable. The USArmed Forces initiatives in the Sahel started in 2002 under the name Pan-SahelInitiative (PSI), encompassing Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. 19 With a limitedbudget of 6,000,000 dollars, the American Army trained and outfittedrapid-reaction units in each of these four countries, which had as their duty tobetter guard the porous state borders in an attempt to stem the flow of illegalpersons, goods and weapons in the region. It was also their duty to prevent theSahel from becoming a retreat for terrorists. American concern was especiallyfocused on the developments in Northern Mali. More than half of the PSIbudget was meant for this region. In 2005 the PSI was continued in the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which has a wider range than itspredecessor. 20 It has a planned time-frame of five years and a budget of half abillion dollars. In addition to the countries previously involved, Algeria, Morocco,Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria also joined the TSCTI, and so will Libyapossibly. The aim is to set up antiterrorism units in each of these countries, aswell as semi-permanent bases of operations for American troops. According tolocal witnesses and GSPC websites, such bases have been set up in NorthernMali, where the old French Air-force base at Tessalit has been readied for use,at Nema (in Mauritania), at Tamanrasset (Algeria), and at Agadez in Niger. In1920www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htmwww.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm.