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REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 259on both sides in the conflict ranges between 2,500 and 3,500. However, thenumber of Tamasheq civilians killed was at least ten times the number ofsedentary victims.Table 6.1 Estimated number of civilian victims June 1990 – October 1995Tamasheq Tamasheq Sedentary SedentaryConfirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed UnconfirmedVictims victims victims victims2,374 734 178 272Source: Klute (2001), annex Opferzahlen (Mali).After ‘Toximine’, the morale of the Malian Armed Forces was deflated, justas the morale of the rebels was boosted. The Malian Armed Forces probablylost at least forty men, almost ten percent of their forces, which is generallyregarded as the de facto destruction of a unit. The rebels lost a third of theirunit, which would in standard army terms mean ‘annihilation’, but the rebelsdid not look at it in this way. These men were martyrs to the cause and they haddied an honourable death in combat. ‘Toximine’ brought in a large amount ofnew weapons taken from the defeated troops, but especially an enormousvictory in their form of warfare: A small group of extremely skilled warriorshad been able to chase an army unit ten times its size, killing a large number ofsoldiers in true combat, man to man. It gave the rebels a feeling of militaryinvincibility. Indeed, one can safely say that the Malian forces never defeatedthe Tamasheq rebels militarily. ‘Toximine’ proved that the regular army was nomatch to the guerrillas, and that a quick military end to the rebellion could notbe reached. In the end, the Malian Armed Forces retreated to the main villagesof North-Eastern Mali, leaving the land to the rebels. Many smaller army postswere entirely abandoned. The defeats of the Malian Armed Forces, combinedwith the troublesome situation the regime found itself in at the capital Bamako,led President Moussa Traoré to decide that negotiations with the rebels werenecessary.Negotiations between the Malian Government and the Tanekra movementstarted in October 1990 with a first reconnaissance mission, and began inearnest in December 1990 on the initiative of The Traoré Regime. The Tamasheqrebellion was not the only problem the Traoré Regime had to face. In thecapital Bamako, a democratic opposition and a free press were making bothTraoré’s handling of the rebellion and his position in general more and moremates the number of civilians killed in the first months at 181 in annex Opferzahlen(Mali). Klute, G. 2001.