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334 EPILOGUEkilling one of the GSPC emirs. 34 The message had a double edge that the ADCtried to play out in the new international settings. Any connection to Muslimmilitancy was denied, but the ADC tried to communicate two different potentialscenarios to the US and to the Algerian Government. Te first was that they werethe force par excellence to fight Muslim militants in the Sahara and they coulddo so if the US would stop its alliance with the Government in Bamako againstthe Kel Tamasheq, and if Algiers was willing to keep playing its role asmediator. 35 But if this situation did not produce itself, and if the US forceswould keep actively supporting the Malian Armed Forces, there was of coursealways the second scenario in which the Kel Tamasheq would indeed turn toMuslim militancy, thereby creating exactly the situation the US tried to avoidwith its military presence. Clearly, the former rebels had learned more aboutinternational policy than their predecessors knew in the days of Alfellaga. Byfar the most important difference between the previous rebellions and this newcrisis was the reaction of the Malian Government. President Amadou ToumaniTouré reacted very prudently to the new rebellion. Contrary to his predecessorshe had personal experience as a leading officer in the Army in fighting therebellion in the 1990s, and it seemed that he had drawn important lessons fromprevious mistakes. The most important mistake ATT avoided was to think instereotypes and to put all Kel Tamasheq away as a possible threat to nationalunity. Thus, loyal administrators and military commanders were not relievedfrom their posts to be replaced by men from the South, as had been done duringAlfellaga. The Governor of the Région of Kidal, Al Amadou ag Iyan, was keptin place, while command over military operations rested with Elhajj Gamou.Repression against civilian Kel Tamasheq was avoided as much as possible.ATT appointed his secretary of state Modibo Sidibe at the head of a crisiscentre which had as one of its primary tasks to make it clear to the MalianArmed Forces and to the population at large that not all Kel Tamasheq wererebels, and to do everything to avoid army repression and pogroms of the kindseen in the 1990s. The number of summary executions and retaliations againstthe civilian population was indeed kept very low.In June, the ADC proposed negotiations through the intermediary of Algeria,to which the Malian Government agreed. The negotiations took place in Algiersbetween 30 June and 4 July, leading to the signing of the Algiers Agreement.3435http://www.kidal.info/infos/news/infos.php. Accrochages mortels entre le GSPC etl’alliance democratique du 23 mai pour le changement.Some observers at Kidal.info saw this attack on the GSPC as ‘tit for tat’ to theAlgerian government, in reimbursement for their mediation with Bamako. On October6 th , 2006 the GSPC retaliated with a counterstrike on an ADC patrol at Taoudennit,the GSPC’s main base, leaving 9 ADC fighters dead and taking two prisoners.