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254 CHAPTER 6the practically unarmed fighters managed to take a large number of arms fromtheir adversaries, and contrary to their predecessors, the ifulagen of 1963, thefighters knew how to handle these weapons and could thus successfully pursuetheir campaign.The tactics of the rebels worked in their favour. All the attacks mentionedabove ended in victory for the rebels, who lost few men compared to the lossesof the Malian Armed Forces. 4 The Malian Armed Forces, present in the Kidalarea with around 500 soldiers, were completely on the defensive and no matchfor their adversary. Contrary to the Tamasheq fighters who had years of trainingand combat experience in guerrilla warfare in Lebanon and Chad, the Maliansoldiers had hardly any training and no combat experience. The heavy and slowmaterial employed in the Adagh by the Malian forces – armoured cars andartillery – were no match either for the fast and agile four-wheel-drive vehiclesused by the experienced Tamasheq drivers who had gained their marks in theyears of smuggle.In 1963, the army’s heavy armoured cars and jeeps proved almost uselessagainst the ifulagen in the Adagh, except in the wadis. The camel mountedifulagen could quickly withdraw over terrain inaccessible to the tanks and jeepsof the army. This time, the rebels also mostly made use of cars, transformedinto so called tecnicals: All-terrain vehicles, equipped with extra fuel and watertanks, and mounted with heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. The driverswould make use of the terrain and the winds to create a dust cloud, obfuscatingthe enemy’s view, then discharging an independently operating fighter unit ofaround twelve men that would fight afoot, encircling the enemy, while thetecnicals heavy machine guns and rocket launchers provided cover fire. Thetechnique of tecnicals was not new or unique to the Tamasheq fighters, who hadfirst learned their use in Chad, where the troops of Goukouni Wedey and IdrissDeby had made use of them.Both sides also differed in their experience and ability to kill. The Maliansoldiers were trained for regular combat in large attacks with coordinated fire.In practice, this means a soldier does not learn how to aim and shoot as a sniper,but to ‘spray’ bullets in sustained fire, creating a wide ‘death zone’. The Tamasheqfighters were trained to aim and shoot at single enemies. In addition, theTamasheq fighters were trained and experienced in man-to-man combat withpersonal arms. The first attacks at Ménaka and Tidarmène were made with ahighly restricted number of rifles, and mostly by men armed with knives and4Cheick ag Baye estimates the number of military casualties on Malian side in thefirst half year of the rebellion at 441, and casualties on rebel side at 28; ‘ChronologieCheick’. Klute estimates the number of military casualties at 429, and rebelcasualties at 17 during this period. ‘Opferzahlen (Mali)’, annex Klute, G. 2001.