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REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 253area simultaneously at 04:00 PM. The intercepted car was to attack the militarycamp at Kidal itself. Arrests followed, but someone must have been able tocommunicate the interception and subsequent arrests to the Ménaka battalion atIkadewan because the next day, 28 June the Ménaka battalion came into action,attacking the administrative posts and military camp in Tidarmène. At the wellsof Tejerert, four cars belonging to the NGO World Vision were taken over. InMénaka, the same NGO and the Italian organisation Zooconsult lost eight morecars. The next day, the administrative posts at Ikadewan were attacked. Theattacks were successful in their aim: Seizing material, as the movement had lostmost of its stocks. The administrative posts and military camps were looted forarms, food and petrol, providing the movement with the necessary means tostart their fight. 2 After their successful attacks the rebels retreated to Mount I-n-Taykaren, a solitary mountain at the southern edge of the Tamesna plain, in thenorthern part of the Cercle of Ménaka.Between June and October 1990 the rebels were constantly on the move,attacking army camps and administrative posts on all sides of the Adagh andparts of the Azawad. On 2 July the military post at Ti-n-Essako was attacked,leaving three soldiers and one rebel dead. On 16 July the rebels attacked thegendarmerie at Tarkimt; 28 July: the military post at Abeïbara; 11 August: themilitary post at Ti-n-Zaouatene; 15 August: those at Tadjoujemet; 17 August:those at Telabit; 25 August: a military convoy near I-n-Ekker was ambushed. InSeptember, attacks on the military posts at Abeïbara, I-n-Tedeyni, and I-n-Gharfollowed. Skirmishes between rebel and army units occurred at the end ofSeptember and the beginning of October at Tadjoujemet and Tadjnout in theTigharghar Mountains. 3 The tactics of the rebels were to attack as often aspossible, in as many different places as possible. The underlying strategy wasfirst of all to give the impression that they were numerous and well organised,thus confusing the enemy, and secondly, to secure the Algerian border in orderto ensure access to supplies. Except for Tarkimt, all the military posts attackedwere situated in the Adagh, near the border with Algeria, the same region ofcombat as during Alfellaga. The Malian army’s withdrawal from the border areawould secure the rebels free passage to Algeria to stock supplies; bringwounded or fatigued fighters to a safe haven; and, in the case of necessity, toretreat altogether. A third aim was to seize more material – weapons, ammunition,petrol, cars, and food – as they were still short in supply and the numberof rebels had increased over the weeks. In the first few months of the rebellion,23Nous, Touaregs du Mali (Paris 1990).Based on: Cheick ag Baye, ‘Chronologie des événements liés à la Rébellion Touarègueau Mali’ (hereafter, chronologie Cheick), in annex to Klute, G. 2001; Boilley,P. 1999: 446-447; and Klute, G. 2001: 440-441.