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256 CHAPTER 6up other positions within the mountain. The only vital points within the basewere the wells, to be defended and held at all costs. Any infrastructure that wasbuilt consisted of a few mud-brick houses serving as shelter and meetingpoints.Most material inside the bases was buried or left in small caves. These baseshad four main aims. First of all, they served as places where the rebels couldhide men and material. Second, by making the location of the bases known tothe army, the rebels hoped to avoid repression against civilians by the army, asthere was no reason for it. The army knew where to find the rebels and couldnot mistake civil camps for rebel units. Third, by making the location known tothe population and other ishumar who had not yet joined the fighters, but whohad received military training at some point in the 1980s, they hoped to attractnew recruits and material support. Also, if the army attacked against civilians,these knew where they could hide under rebel protection. Finally, by setting upbases within Mali, instead of retreating into Algeria after attacks as the ifulagenhad done in 1963, the rebels hoped to gain more support from the localpopulation. These would notice that the rebels did not abandon them to theirfate after stirring problems, while they themselves remained behind for thearmy to come. Clearly, the rebels had learned some tactical and strategic lessonsfrom their ifulagen predecessors.After the attacks at Ménaka and Tidarmène the rebels left messages for thearmy indicating their location. This message was repeated over the radio at theconquered gendarmerie post at Tarkimt. The message was basically inviting theMalian army to combat, an invitation that could be expected from Tamasheqwarriors following the honourable aqqa conduct of warfare. The ethics of theishumar in warfare were just as much informed by Tamasheq war ethics andhonourable conduct as that of the ifulagen had been in 1963. The ishumar sawthemselves as the new illellan: the strong protectors of society who shoulddefend the tilaqqiwin, the weak. By staying in the neighbourhood and offeringprotection sites, the rebels ascribed to their perceived ellellu status in takingmeasures to protect the weak and dependent. And only through aqqa attackscould egha – revenge for humiliation – be acted out.In the first few months of the rebellion, the strategy underlying the creationof fixed bases was partly successful. The Malian army accepted the invitation tocome and fight at I-n-Taykaren. On 17 July 1990 a large section of the MalianArmed Forces arrived at I-n-Taykaren to fight the rebel forces. The armyemployed four hundred infantry and artillery units armed with truck-mountedrocket launchers at their siege of the base. After four days of shelling, theunharmed rebels easily countered the infantry assault. The shelling had been toorandom and too small in scale to do any harm. The rebel forces awaited the endof Malian fire from the safety of the rocks and caves, planning to resume theirpositions when the infantry advanced. When the infantry attack finally came,