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REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 257they were shot one by one. A day of sniper activity left the Malian ArmedForces with forty men dead, which was enough to have them retreat. Theoperation was repeated at the end of July and the beginning of August, with aneven more disastrous effect. Despite hundreds of shells being fired at I-n-Taykaren in a week, the following infantry attack failed again, leaving ahundred Malian soldiers dead on the field. 7 A similar attack at the rebel base ofEssali near Boughessa was equally unsuccessful. Here, the rebels simply left thebase for the surrounding mountains, only to return when the Army retreated,without doing battle. The Army was quick to learn that rebel bases were invinciblewhen defended and not worth going to or staying in when abandoned.The Malian Army also quickly learned that when it set up a base itself, it wasprone to deadly attacks by rebel forces. The largest victory the rebels had overthe Malian forces, recognised as their worst defeat by the Army itself, came onthe night of 4 September 1990 at the wells of Toximine near Mount Tigharghar.Here, a force of around 45 rebels, armed with knives and hand grenades, tookon an army unit of around 450 soldiers, supported by armoured cars, mortarsand rocket launchers. Making use of the terrain, the internal organisation of themilitary camp and the element of surprise, the rebel unit entered the camp;engaged in close combat with the Malian soldiers; captured the heavy firearmswhich they deployed immediately against further removed quarters of the camp;and finally dispersed the Malian forces in panic. Afterwards, rebels claimed tohave killed more than a hundred soldiers at Toximine, whereas they suffered aloss of fifteen men. 8The reaction of the Army to the rebellion was at first very similar to theoptions chosen during Alfellaga. The tactic of installing a ‘forbidden zone’could not be employed effectively as the terrain of operation was no longerconfined to the Adagh, but included all of North-Eastern Mali. Nevertheless, theArmy tried to install ‘concentration zones’ around the main cities and villagesof the North and ‘zones of free circulation’, next to ‘combat zones’. 9 By the endof July 1990, the state of emergency and a curfew after 23:00 hours weredeclared in all of Northern Mali. 10 Transport by four-wheel-drive vehicles wasforbidden, as this was the rebels’ chosen means of transport. 11 Trucks needed7891011Nous, Touaregs du Mali (Paris 1990).Klute, G. 2001: 480-486.Ibid.: 414, mentions the concentration and combat zones. The zones of free circulationare mentioned in annex Comission ad – hoc sur les évènements du nord (sessionsdes 18, 19, 20 Octobre 1990), Boilley, P. 1994: 846-851.‘Des nouvelles atrocités auraient été commises contre les civils touaregs’, Le Monde,05/09/1990.Annex Transcriptions de messages radio de l’armée malienne (Documents provenantde la serviette du sous-lieutenant Diawara Gollé, commandant du poste de Bou-