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306 CHAPTER 6arms in Northern Mali and the disarmament of the movements in 1994. Theyconcluded that no action could be undertaken until a larger degree of securityhad been established. 98 These circumstances had come in July 1995, when vander Graaf undertook a second mission, parallel to the Round Table Conferenceof Timbuktu, held between 15 and 18 July 1995, uniting the Malian Government,the MFUA and Ganda Koy, and the international donor community. 99The aim of the conference was to allocate money to the reconstruction ofNorthern Mali and the ending of the conflict. During the five years the conflicthad lasted, donor countries and NGOs had made various promises to contributefinancially to peace. In addition, money had accumulated that had been reservedfor ongoing projects in Northern Mali that had been postponed in wait of betterdays. In all, during the Timbuktu Round Table, an estimated 150,000,000 USdollars were promised as contribution to the reconstruction of the North whenlasting peace would be established. This large boon greatly helped to appeasethe warring factions. A last, but certainly the most important measure, was thecreation of the FAR-Nord; a fund to finance peace in the North or, better put, tofinance the disarmament and integration of the former fighters according to vander Graaf’s plan for disarmament. This plan essentially consisted of the creationof special sites in the North where fighters who wished to integrate into theMalian Armed Forces or civil society could present themselves and hand overtheir weapons. In return for their arms, the fighters would be registered in theintegration projects, with the assurance that they would either integrate into theArmy, or would be financially assisted in setting up a civilian life. In themeantime, they would stay in the camps, where free food, clothes and basicarmy training were provided, as well as an entry bonus of 20,000 CFA and 600CFA per day salary. 100 In other words, their arms, hearts and minds werebought. Bluntly put, peace was bought for a relatively small sum of money incomparison with amounts spent on other peace operations organised by thesame or similar international organisations. That this could be done is due to theextreme state of impoverishment Northern Mali found itself in after fourdecades of war and drought. Even during the major part of my fieldwork inNorthern Mali in the late 1990s, three years after the end of the war and the startof economic reconstruction, it was not uncommon to meet people who ownednothing but the clothes on their body, a few rags to construct a tent, and a pot to98Graaf, H. van der, Sahara-Sahel advisory mission report (unpublished document,n.p., n.d.), courtesy of Lt.-Gen. (Ret.) van der Graaf, who kindly gave me this documentfrom his personal archives.99Unless indicated, based on: Republique du Mali, Rencontre Gouvernement-Partenairessur le Nord-Mali. Version provisoire 7 Juin 1995 (unpublished document,n.p., n.d.), courtesy of Lt.-Gen. (Ret.) van der Graaf.100 ‘Léré: La paix est cantonnée’, Les Echos, 03/02/1996.