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260 CHAPTER 6problematic. In 1979, General Moussa Traoré had changed the military style ofhis regime to a civil one in founding a one-party state, governed by the UnionDémocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) over which he presided. But the onepartystate was as undemocratic and oppressive as its predecessors. In 1990, thedemocratic movement gained momentum. Possibly under the influence of theTamasheq rebellion, but certainly under the moral support of French PresidentMitterand’s speech at the Franco-African Summit at La Baule in May 1990, inwhich he linked development aid to ‘good governance’ and democratisation. On15 October 1990, fifteen young men took to the streets of Bamako to protestagainst the Traoré Regime, carrying banners with slogans such as ‘Down withthe UDPM’. 17 A few days later, the student union Association des Etudiants etElèves Maliens (AEEM) was born. In the same month, two covert politicalparties founded in exile in France and Senegal came to the open; the ComitéNational d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID); and the Alliance pour la Démocratieau Mali (ADEMA). The already existing national labour union UnionNational des Travaileurs Maliens (UNTM), hitherto an appendix to the regime,rallied to the side of the democrats. Together, these organisations formed amassive front against the Traoré Regime. But there was not only external oppositionurging for democracy. Inside the UDPM, a large faction demanded multipartydemocracy, or at least a democratisation of the party itself. AlthoughTraoré gave in to the wish to reform the party, demands for multi-party democracywere initially put aside. 18 The pressure build-up in Bamako, together withthe demoralizing defeats of the Army by the Tamasheq rebels, led to theopening of negotiations between the regime and the rebels. Probably, MoussaTraoré hoped to calm the situation in the North in order to have troops andattention free to deal with the democratic movement in the South.The reasons the rebels had to negotiate were just as practical as those of theTraoré Regime: they were exhausted. Having started the rebellion with nothingbut a handful of guns, they desperately lacked resources by the end of 1990.The diminishing supply of petrol, ammunition and especially food hamperedthe continuation of attacks and even the possibilities of adequate defence.In fact, we had expected that a solution would be found within six months of combat.And the Malians fell for our strategy. Six months, that was the maximum beforethe Army would recuperate, and we had to make a maximum of resounding victoriesto bring it home, to change mentalities in Mali, and to provoke all the upcomingchanges. (...) We did not expect a longer fight, first because of a lack of means, also1718Brenner, L. 1994.‘Conseil national extraordinaire de l’UDPM: L’immobilisme’, Cauris, n.d. 1990.