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286 CHAPTER 6perhaps with the help of comrades who had not deserted. Even the desertion ofCaptain Maïga and his men is questionable. They might well have been authorisedto desert and create their movement by their superiors, and although anyform of proof is lacking, the common opinion in Mali holds this to be the case.The army had for long been dissatisfied with the way the Government dealtwith the rebellion and its leniency towards renegade rebels and the MFUA.Some officers still believed a military victory against the rebels was possible,despite their resounding defeats in 1990. Even if Maïga and his men had reallydeserted, no one made efforts to arrest them. The general public in Mali approvedof Maïga’s actions. Support organisations were created in Bamako andelsewhere. 58 Active financial support for the Ganda Koy even came from thevast Songhay commercial networks in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, andfrom the indigenous Songhay community in Niger. 59 Rumours had it the GandaKoy fighters were provisioned in arms by the dissatisfied part of the MalianArmed Forces.The Ganda Koy followed strategies similar to the Tamasheq rebels. Theymade use of tecnicals for transport and attacks. In addition the Ganda Koy usedboats to patrol and control the riverain villages. They made use of theenvironment the Songhay were used to and improved the fighting tactics theSonghay knew. In pre-colonial times, Songhay pirates and river borne raidingparties had been as much feared on the banks of the river Niger as KelTamasheq raiders had been in the desert. 60 The Ganda Koy set up a base on anisland in the Niger River near the village of Fafa. On 26 May the Ganda Koystruck its first blow at the village of Tacharane, killing nine Kel Tamasheq.Hearing about the attack at Tacharane, the Commission Monitoring the CeaseFire started an investigation headed by MFUA and FIAA leader Zahaby ouldSidi Mohamed. They quickly discovered that the attack had been launched byboat from the Ganda Koy riverain base at Fafa. Leading a mixed patrol, mostlymade up of his own FIAA fighters, Zahaby went to Fafa and attacked the GandaKoy base on 4 June. The Ganda Koy fighters fled, leaving most of theirpossessions behind. Among these were documents that proved the implicationof Ganda Koy fighters in the massacre at Léré in 1991 that had cost the lives offifty Bidân. 61 In turn, Zahaby’s patrol was attacked on its way back from Fafaby an armoured car of the Malian Armed Forces. In the ensuing fight, the mixedpatrol managed to put the armoured car out of action, but it cost the life ofBoubacar ould Sadeck, FIAA’s military commander. The next day, in retali-58596061‘Les ressortissants d’Ansongo à Bamako réclament la suppression du Pacte National’,Le Républicain, 26/05/1994.‘Nord: la vraie fausse paix’, Le Républicain, 18/05/1994.Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 1969.‘Comment fut démantelée la base de Gandakoy à Fafa’, Union, 21/06/1994.

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