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332 EPILOGUE10. the democratic deficit and the absence of social justice within parts of the TuaregCommunity in the Adrar encourages omerta, violence and permanent small scalerebellions [révoltes de poche]. 30If one compares Zeidane’s analysis and the narrative above following similarlines to that of the previous rebellions sketched in this book, it becomes clearthat the situation in 2006 resembles more closely that of 1963 than that of 1990.Local and national politics become enmeshed to form the ingredients of aviolent dispute in an attempt to regain independence and a preceived lostpolitical power. A major difference with the rebellion of the 1990s was theposition and armament of the insurgents. While, at the moment of their attack inJune 1990, the movement no longer possessed any means of warfare, the ADCpossessed a large amount of heavy arms taken from the army bases theypreviously occupied as officers and soldiers themselves. 31 Thus, from the start,the ADC was just as well equipped as the Malian Army, from whence it moreor less sprang. A second difference is in tactics and strategy. The ADC officersand men took with them a number of non-Tamasheq soldiers as prisoners ofwar when taking the material from the bases. If no other demand was met, theycould at least discuss the situation of these POWs. The taking and keeping ofPOWs became an integral part of this conflict, with the ADC and its lateroffshoot ATNMC taking Malian soldiers prisoner on a large scale (at one pointthe ATNMC held over 70 soldiers and officers as prisoners) as means ofpressure. In the later phases of the conflict, especially in 2007, the ADC andATNMC were accused, rightly or not, of using landmines as part of a strategyof besieging army bases, notably the army base at Ti-n-Zaouatene. With thenew heavy equipment, new tactics became available other than the hypermobileguerrilla warfare of the 1990s. A further difference with the previousrebellions was the international situation in which the events played out. Alfellagawas set in a context of international ignorance and indifference to theplight of the Kel Tamasheq. Al-Jebha played in an international context wherethe great powers still did not care, but also one in which international media3031http://www.kidal.info/Forum/FRv1/lire.php?msg=5581. Zeidane lists a further 4points that are more observations on the present situation than causes for the conflict.From the above narrative it is clear that I largely share his vision and analysis,and that mine is partly based on his, although in large parts I reached my conclusionsindependenly from Zeidane by following the news. This particular analysisis shared by other outside observers, such as Pierre Boilley, who expressed similarviews during the round table “Les rébellions au nord Niger et au nord Mali. 1990-2008” organised at the CEMAF in Paris 18/04/2008.A news item filmed by Al-Jazeera showed heavy anti-aircraft guns in possession ofthe deserters. Al-Jazeera Arabic. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbdTbaL9o_Q.Added to YouTube 29/02/2008.