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166 CHAPTER 4geographical and historical perspective. 28 The position of the Adagh near theAlgerian border permitted the ifulagen to retreat into Algeria after attacks.However, relations between Mali and Niger were far less fraternal than betweenMali and Algeria, and fighters could well have retreated there too. The mountainouslandscape of the Adagh gives a second explanation. The ridges andboulders in the Adagh made pursuit of the ifulagen by the motorised army unitsdifficult. In the more flat and sandy area of the Azawad, this advantage waslost. But neither explanation accounts for the lack of other Kel Tamasheq warriorscoming to the Adagh to join the rebellion in the Adagh itself. Boilleyexplains the lack of participation by other groups as a result of their memory ofmilitary defeat in the period of colonial conquest. Indeed, this explanation isstill given today by the Ouillimiden for remaining aside in both post-colonialrevolts. However, some Kel Tamasheq from outside the Adagh had joined theifulagen. Younes and Ilyas ag Ayyouba were Daoussahak, a group which hadnever been part of the Kel Adagh. One of the main political leaders was MohamedAli ag Attaher Insar, the former amenokal of the Kel Intessar. Some ofhis men did most likely join the ifulagen in Algeria. Besides these leaders anumber of others had joined the ifulagen from the Bourem, Ansongo andMénaka Cercles. 29 We cannot estimate the total number of people from outsidethe Adagh who participated in the revolt but they were most likely a minoritywithin the movement. Nevertheless, they were there.OrganisationThe ifulagen were organised into several units ranging in size between twentyand thirty men under shifting leadership. Often only half the unit consisted offighters. The other members – unarmed and in civilian dress – served as scoutswho contacted people for information on army movements. As the rebellionprogressed, new groups of men rallied collectively under the leadership of oneof their own and operated as a new unit. Sometimes units merged to direct ageneral attack on an army post or column. The ifulagen divided the Adagh intothree zones of operation from north to south but this was not taken too strictly.Around thirty men were active in each zone. The first zone consisted of theTimetrine, a plain west of the actual Adagh Mountains. Operations in this zonewere generally led by the brothers Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick. Thesecond zone went from Mount Tigharghar and Mount Doriet to Boughessa, and2829Boilley, P. 1999: 346-348.Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle deKidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. Participationof men of the Ishidenharen tribe from the Ménaka area was emphatically stressedduring various conversations I had with members of that tribe.

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