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REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 287ation to Zahaby’s action, seven integrated rebels had their throats cut by membersof their unit at the army post of Gourma Rharous. 62 The day after, integratedrebels and FIAA fighters retorted by attacking the army post and prisonat Niafunké, killing nine men and stealing two cars, while simultaneouslyattacking the village of Tonka. 63 One day later, on 10 June 1994, most integratedrebels had deserted their stations, with the exception of integrated MPAmembers. The leaders of the various movements, often staying in Gao orBamako, returned to the rebel bases. Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed, until then anegotiating moderate, became one of the most intransigent military leaders,commanding the FIAA from its base at Almoustarat. His colleague Zeidane agSidi Alamine returned to the FPLA base at I-n-Taykaren. Negotiations and thesemblance of peace provided by the National Pact mirage came to an end. Whatfollowed were the bloodiest months the North had witnessed.These first days of renewed violence and the nature of the Ganda Koy weredecisive for what followed. As the first encounters had been between GandaKoy, the Army and members of the FIAA, it was the latter movement, whichhad until then remained in the background, which took the lead in fighting theGanda Koy. Proof that the deserted soldiers forming the Ganda Koy had beenamong the ‘butchers of Léré’ in 1991 resolved FIAA determination to avengeactions by the Ganda Koy against their kin. Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed, themain MFUA spokesman and one of the most outspoken intellectuals within themovement, became Mali’s ‘public enemy number one’. His ‘treason’ of theNational Pact and the reopening of hostilities provoked army support for theGanda Koy to a point where it became unclear if attacks were committed byCaptain Maïga’s deserters or by regular troops. The Ganda Koy consistedmostly of soldiers and fighters of Songhay origins inhabiting the villages andcities at the banks of the Niger River. Therefore, most attacks made by theGanda Koy were concentrated at the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân population livingin the Niger Bend. Many Kel Tamasheq of the Niger Bend had settled after thedroughts of the 1970s and 1980s, often creating villages of their own. Thesesedentarised Kel Tamasheq had not been part of the Teshumara as they hadstayed in Mali and neither had they been part of the Tanekra. All of NorthernMali was engaged in the war, but most victims fell in the riverain villages andcamps in a spiral of attacks and counter-attacks. After the first week of fightingbetween movements, the attacks changed in nature. Both sides in the conflictnow concentrated their attacks on civilians. If the Ganda Koy and the Armyattacked Tamasheq and Bidân camps and villages, the FIAA and FPLA would6263‘Nord: La montée des périls’, Union, 21/06/1994.‘Les attaques des hommes de Zahaby’, L’Observateur, 03/10/1994; ‘Le lieutenantAbdoulaye Cissé dit Blo: le tueur de Ber demasqué’, Union, 19/07/1994.