ASC-075287668-2887-01

ALFELLAGA 169cars from the Bamako based tank squadron. In all, army presence in the Adaghstill amounted to about 1,500 men, 40 armoured cars and around 160 vehicles(trucks, jeeps, fuel trucks, et cetera). To keep men and material rolling 200,000litres of fuel and food for a 1,000 men for 3 months had to be shipped to Kidal.Raids, skirmishes and ambushesDespite the deployment of more than half of its effective strength, the MalianArmed Forces could not bring the rebellion to an end. First of all, cars werehighly ineffective in large parts of the Adagh. Most of the Adagh consists ofvery rough terrain; sharp rocks and boulders and sudden steep climbs. Therough terrain demobilised the vehicles, which were under constant repair, andspare parts were lacking. Logistical problems in the transport of water for thetroops and fuel for the vehicles further hampered the mobility and effectivenessof the Malian Armed Forces. The Adagh consists of a number of importantmountain ranges separated by wadis and valleys. Most clashes between armyand rebels took place in three of these mountains: Mount Tigharghar; MountDoriet to the west of Mount Tigharghar; and Mount Ouzzein. This landscape isideal for ambush tactics. It is especially advantageous when fighting motorisedforces. The relatively flat and sandy wadis are the only suitable terrain for cars,which had great trouble on the stony surface of the mountains. The wadis aregenerally closed in by boulder formations, sand dunes, or low but steep mountains.The Malian Armed Forces largest weapon was basically an armoured personnelcarrier equipped with heavy machine guns, but with an open top. It wasnot difficult for the ifulagen to shoot at the soldiers inside from their highground positions.The ifulagen did not suffer from the disadvantages of motorised vehicles.Their camels had far less difficulty with the stony surface of the Adagh. Afteran attack the camel-mounted ifulagen could easily retreat over the rocks into themountains, where the heavy armoured cars, truck and jeeps were unable tofollow them. Lack of water and fuel supplies did not hamper them in retreat inthe way it hampered the Malian Armed Forces. Of course, this advantage waslost when the rebels had to fight the equally camel-mounted goum forces. Infact, the only unit the rebels feared was the GNIG14; the goum unit, mountedon camels and armed with the same MAS-36 rifles the ifulagen used, andheaded by a Kel Tamasheq officer. The attacks of the ifulagen against theMalian forces were therefore mostly directed against the camel herds of thegoum forces to deprive them of their means of combat and pursuit. In August1963, a group of about fifty ifulagen under Sidi Alamine ag Cheick and Ikhlou