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252 CHAPTER 6the autochtonous Malian population. By stressing the rebels’ ‘whiteness’, theGanda Koy managed to develop an othering discourse that left aside thoseelements of Tamasheq society that were not ‘white’: the bellah or former slaveswho could and did join the Ganda Koy ranks. Indeed, the bellah had beenlargely and conspicuously absent within the Tanekra. From their side, rebelspokesmen rightly accused the Ganda Koy of developing a racist and nationaldiscourse of the Kel Tamasheq other. But contrary to the 1950s and 1960s, theKel Tamasheq community now had the means to defend itself against thesestereotypes: Kel Tamasheq intellectuals countered the Ganda Koy’s polemicallanguage and denied it by stressing the positive consequence of their rebellion:the end of dictatorship in Mali and the establishment of a multi-party democracy.The ‘real’ rebellion: June to December 1990The start of the rebellion was originally planned for around 1992 or even 1993,but some men and material had already been moved to Mali by 1989, organisedin three battalions stationed in Kidal, Ménaka, and Gao. 1 However, the MalianArmed Forces had been informed of the Tanekra plans. In May 1990, membersof the Kidal and Gao battalions were arrested, and their arms depots confiscated.Only the Ménaka battalion of about 30 men was left unharmed, but ithad very few arms. The commander of the Kidal battalion, Iyad ag Ghali, hadmanaged to escape and fled to the Ménaka battalion, based in the village ofIkadewan. Upon arrival in Ikadewan, Iyad ag Ghali was accused of treason bythe men of the Ménaka battalion and nearly executed. After convincing theMénaka battalion of his good intentions and diverting execution by his comrades,Iyad and the Ménaka commanders discussed the situation the movementfound itself in. With some of their most important leaders arrested and theirarms confiscated, the fighters could either cancel all plans and start fromscratch, or they could move forward in attack. They chose the latter option andset the start of the rebellion for the 4 th of July, the celebration that year of ‘aidal-fitr, the end of Ramadan. But this plan failed as well. On 27 June 1990 aMalian border patrol looking for smugglers intercepted a rebel vehicle carryingmen and arms. After a short fight, the patrol managed to immobilise the vehicle,while its occupants escaped. Apart from arms, the vehicle contained a documenton the plan of attack. Members of the movement, stationed in their regions oforigins were supposed to attack the administrative and military posts in their1The following is based on: Lettre 1er adjoint Cdt. Cercle Kidal à Gov. Gao. Sujet –Mouvement de Liberation des Terres Tamacheq. 12/07/1990. Courtesy of PierreBoilley; and Interview with Baye ag Alhassan. Ménaka, 11/04/1999.