ASC-075287668-2887-01

44 CHAPTER 1project, the Soudanese Senator Amadou Bâ proposed to amend the law suchthat:The organisation of the Saharan regions should in no case lead to the creation of anautonomous territory. 53After further debate, Houphouët-Boigny managed to convince the Soudaneseof the good intentions of the OCRS. His legal proposition was acceptedand the OCRS was created on 10 January 1957. For Soudan Français this meantthe inclusion of the Saharan parts of the Cercles Goundam, Timbuktu and Gaoin the new structure. Soudanese suspicions were revived however, by the reactionof the French political establishment. François Mitterand, then Ministerof Justice reacted in favour of the OCRS, butI would nevertheless have liked a more structured Saharan territory, in greaterconformity with its geographical realities, administratively more autonomous fromAlgeria and the Black African Territories bordering to the South. 54The ensuing creation of a Ministry of Saharan Affairs in June 1957, headedby Max Lejeune, former secretary of state at the Ministry of Defence madematters far worse. The new ministry was endowed with economic, social, diplomaticand political competences over the Algerian Territoires du Sud, reshapedinto French Départements in August 1957, and the Northern parts of SoudanFrançais, Niger and Tchad (the limits of which were never specified). Thediplomatic and political competences given to this ministry made clear that theFrench had more than economic intentions with the OCRS. 55 From that pointonwards, the political leaders of the AOF were no longer the only ones tooppose the OCRS. The Ministry of Saharan Affairs had been created to thedetriment of the competence of the Ministry of Overseas Territories. Thus,some colonial administrators in AOF, who did not want to lose a part of theirjob or influence, and the Ministry of Overseas Territories, which felt likewise,now backed the African politicians against the competition of this new ministry.Marcel Cardaire and the Qadi of TimbuktuThe OCRS had fierce supporters within the French administration and militaryservices, and also among the Bidân and Kel Tamasheq elite. Two players inparticular stand out: the French intelligence officer in Soudan Français, MarcelCardaire; and the Bidân notable, Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick, betterknown as ‘the Qadi of Timbuktu’.535455Sahara, administration générale, correspondance et études au sujet de l’OCRS,1954-1956. ANSOM – 1affpol/2321/4.François Mitterand in L’Essor, 08/03/1957. In: Keita, N. 2005: 7.Keita, N. 2005: 5.