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124 CHAPTER 3portance in the buildup of political tension toward the rebellion of 1963. Thepolitical ideas and ideals of the Kel Adagh – of internal autonomy or at least ameasure of control over their own organisational institutions – were shattered,setting the tone for State/Tamasheq relations in the decades to come. But it isalso simply illustrative of the Malian policy toward chieftaincy: It is indecisivenessand makeshift pragmatism, cloaked in socialist rhetoric.Attaher had two potential heirs: His sons Zeyd and Intalla. Both had beenassistant chiefs to their father in the late 1950s and thus had experience in command,while the administration had some experience with both men. Intalla andZeyd had opposing opinions on the position of the Adagh in Mali. Intalla was infavour of cooperation with the Malian authorities. He had become a member ofthe US-RDA in 1958, and was therefore highly favoured by the Keita Regime.Zeyd had always opposed the inclusion of the Adagh in Mali. In the debates onwho should succeed their father, these opposing views evidently played animportant part. Both the French and Malian administrators, and the Kel Adaghcharacterised Intalla as a ‘real chief’: Authoritative, authoritarian even; intelligentand able-bodied. He was also seen as a moderniser, interested in economicdevelopment and in favour of modern education. His modernity and willingnessto cooperate with the Keita Regime meant however that the Kel Adagh disfavouredhim as the new amenokal, despite his qualities.The French opened their school in 1947, but cheick Baye [an influential religiousleader] told Attaher not to send the children to school. Attaher was very religious, sohe did what cheick Baye said. (...) In 1956 or 1955 Attaher sent Intalla to France forthe parade [celebrating 14 July]. There he met other Tamasheq chiefs, such asMohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick. They said: “You are stupid. We are maraboutsbut we can read and write French, we can stand up for our rights. You don’t knowanything and will be deceived”. At that moment Intalla understood that Attaher hadbeen mistaken to listen to cheick Baye. He took his camel and went to the camps togather children for the school. Attaher told him: “If you want to remain my son, youstop this”, so Intalla stopped. Intalla then decided to live in the city [of Kidal] and tostart a shop. Perhaps this example would get the Ifoghas interested in the school. Buteverybody laughed at him. “Intalla is looking for candy, just like the children”, theysaid. After two years he gave up, discouraged. I remember that as children we wouldsay: ‘Our Zeyd and Intalla the Frenchman’. That’s how we called him then, ‘Intallathe Frenchman’. 18The impression all parties had of Zeyd was just as unanimous. He was seenas less fit to be a chief; less authoritative; amiable, but a loose cannon and not infavour of cooperation with the Malian administration. His later actions as leaderof the rebellion are the strongest proof of his anti-Malian sentiments, but theywere not the first signs of his discontent. In the summer of 1961 Zeyd had spent18Conversation with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 08/06/1999.