ASC-075287668-2887-01

REVOLUTION: TESHUMARA AND TANEKRA 239sence of a large number of Arab peoples in Africa could unify the Arab andAfrican world. The FPLSAC, explicitly referring to a native Arab presence inSub Sahara Africa, fitted with this policy.The FPLSAC was not only given an office for its political bureau, the movementgot access to military training camps as well. In the 1980s, Libya hostedseveral liberation movements, the best known being the IRA, the ANC andseveral Palestinian groups. In theory, each group had its own camp underLibyan auspices, but in practice the Libyans provided infrastructure, materialand food only. A first training camp for the Kel Tamasheq, called Camp an-Nasr, was opened in December 1980 near the village of Ben Walid (thereforethe camp was also known as Ben Walid). By March 1981 the camp lodged anestimated 2,700 recruits. When the camp was closed to the Kel Tamasheq inlate 1981, an estimated 4,000 recruits had received basic military training. 93 Thecamps were not only a male experience. In the camps, Tamasheq women, butalso other African women, cooked and cared for the recruits, as the camp wasshared with freedom fighters for other causes, such as the Sudanese. The recruitswere trained by Libyan, Palestinian and Lebanese officers. The trainingincluded instruction in personal arms and unarmed combat but focused most onphysical endurance through long marches. On a voluntary basis, recruits couldtake evening classes in literacy, history and revolutionary instruction, mostlythrough Qadhafi’s Green Book. In early 1981, a second camp was opened,Camp Badr, which lodged the families of the recruits.LebanonBy the end of 1981, the camp at Ben Walid was closed. There are a number ofpossible explanations for this closure. Pierre Boilley has inscribed the logic ofthe closure within the international setting of Libyan politics. Qadhafi’s involvementin the Chadian Aouzou conflict, together with the involvement of theNigerien Kel Tamasheq in the Tanekra, notably the former leaders of the 1976coup attempt, had deteriorated Qadhafi’s relations with Niger, leading to diplomaticrupture in 1981. The subsequent attacks of Kel Tamasheq commandos inMali at Fanfi and at the uranium mines of Arlit in Niger (infra) further damagedstrained relations. Finally, in 1982, Libya stopped its support for the Kel Tamasheqand perhaps other African movements in view of the 19 th OAU summit,which Qadhafi intended to host. 94 My Kel Adagh informants also placed theclosure of the camp in an international context, but did not fail to link it withtheir own activities. According to Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall, thecamp was closed for the following reason. In January 1981, the FPLSAC exe-9394Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 27/12/1998.Boilley, P. 1999: 421-427.