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REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 275organisation, which ran large projects in the Niger Bend. Zahaby was a typicalévolué. Perhaps the clearest example of the ishumar retreat and the rise of theintellectuals is the signing of the National Pact by the hardliner movementFPLA. At first, the FPLA’s military and political leader Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamedhad refused to sign the National Pact, condemning it as yet anotherattempt to sell Tamasheq independence in exchange for some small privileges.In the end, the FPLA did sign the National Pact, under the signature of Zeidaneag Sidi Alamine, also a former employee of the Norwegian AEN, a relative toFPLA leader Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed and representing the FPLA within theMFUA.Zeidane explains that he and Rhissa disagreed over the 1992 National Pact. Zeidanetravelled to Bamako and signed it on behalf of the FPLA. Rhissa only came round tosupporting the Pact in 1994, but “since 1992 I have consistently worked for theapplication of the Pact, which provides a good framework for integration”, saysZeidane. 37From the perspective of the FPLA, notably from Rhissa himself, Zeidane’saction could only be seen as a coup against Rhissa, a Lebanon veteran andashamor of the first hour. The FPLA therefore continued its attacks against theMalian Armed Forces. The non-implementation of the National Pact and theconstant renewal of negotiations between the MFUA intellectuals and movementleaders created substantial friction between, on the one hand, the MFUAmembers and the movements’ leaders, and their fighters on the other. As manymilitary leaders left the bases in the Adagh and Azawad for longer periods oftime in Bamako, Algiers or Tamanrasset, discipline within the bases dropped.The MFUA intellectuals and high ranking officers were housed in luxuriousvillas and hotels in Bamako, while the fighters were still living on a militarydiet and sleeping on the rocks in their mountain bases. No results were forthcomingfrom the long protracted negotiations. The Malian Government wasreluctant to meet new demands and promises already made were never fulfilled,which led the fighters to look upon negotiators with mounting suspicion and toaccuse them of selling out the Tamasheq cause for their own interests. Thewaning discipline and morale in the rebel bases resulted in the temporary desertionof many fighters who, on their own account, started to attack merchantconvoys, tourists and villages. Both the Malian Government and the MFUAnegotiators were quick to denounce these attacks as ‘acts of banditry’. Both theMFUA and the Malian Government had every interest in making these declarationsas the Malian opposition parties were eager to attack the Government overthe way it dealt with the rebellion, and as the MFUA members did not want to37Interview with Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine in Frères d’Armes (1994, p.13). In: Ibid.:94.