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EPILOGUE 335Whereas the National Pact in 1992 stipulated problems and solutions intendedfor the whole of Northern Mali, the Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal Régions, theAlgiers Agreement concentrated entirely on the Région of Kidal. 36 This wasmore or less logical. Just like Alfellaga, but unlike Al-Jebha, the ADC wasentirely based on the Kel Adagh, addressing and expressing issues internal tothe Kel Adagh. But unlike Alfellaga, the ADC had virtually no support fromoutside the Adagh. While opposition to the National Pact from outside theNorth had always been strong, the Algiers Agreement received opposition fromboth Southerners and Northerners claiming that the President had bowed to thedemands of ‘the Kidal rogues’. However, if it was indeed President Touré’sintention to stop the conflict as soon as possible and without high costs inhuman lives and material, and if one takes into account that given the militaryequipment, training and combat experience of the Kel Adagh mutineers thecosts might indeed have run high, the price paid in the Algiers Agreement wasvery low. It must be said to his credit, however partial this might sound, thatPresident Amadou Toumani Touré handled the new crisis with great resolve,determined not to let violence spiral out of control, despite the public attacksmade on his honour for not choosing the military option against the insurgents.After initial political resistance in the National Assembly, it became possible toput the Algerian Agreement into effect by early 2007. Throughout February andMarch 2007, ADC fighters descended from the bases in Mount Tigharghar tonewly installed cantonment camps. On 12 March a large number of the seizedarms were ceremoniously handed over to the Malian Armed Forces, andbetween 22 and 24 March an international forum on development took place inKidal, as had been stipulated in the Algiers Agreement.But the new conflict was not over. As during Al-Jebha, refractory parties,disagreeing with the Algiers Agreement, split off to continue the fight. Contraryto Iyad ag Ghali and Hassan ag Fagaga and their men, Ibrahim Bahanga and a36The integral text of the Algiers Agreement can be downloaded at http://www.kidal.info/docs/Accord-Alger040706.pdf. The agreement stipulates hardly any measureson development that were not already been taken in by the National Pact and, infact, parts of which were in progress at the start of the mutiny. As in the NationalPact, the most elaborate clauses were on the integration in the Malian Armed Forcesof former ADC fighters. One new demand was one hour of broadcasting time forregional matters on national television (of which all Malian Régions would benefit)and one very old point was finally won: academic degrees in Arabic were to berecognised as valid for administrative applications, a final victory for the longsoughtintegration of Arabic in the educational curriculum. One very importantmeasure from the National Pact that had not been put into effect was now finallyagreed upon: a ten-year tax exemption for the Kidal Région to catch up with itseconomic underdevelopment. This measure had created outrage in Mali at the time,and again met with heavy resistance when included in the Algiers Agreement.

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