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324 EPILOGUEContrary to what more suspicious minds would have anticipated, the TablighiJamaat quickly lost popularity in Kidal and in Mali in general after theevents of September 2001. The inhabitants of the Sahel quickly realized whatthe adoption of global Salafi Islam might lead to. Many realized the linkbetween radical Islam at home and the terrorist attacks abroad and fearedpossible retaliation. But religious questions nevertheless retained local prominenceafter 9/11. 14 From that moment on, the Pentagon and US intelligenceturned a higher degree of attention to the outer reaches of the Muslim world:areas that bore some form of resemblance to Afghanistan within the interpretationof the US military and foreign affairs experts; areas with a favourableterrain for guerrilla warfare; with little or no state presence; and with increasedactivity of militant Muslims. They shared this focus of attention with theiradversaries, the propagators of worldwide jihad. In April 2006, for example, acertain Abu Azzam al-Ansari wrote the article ‘Al-Qaeda is moving to Africa’in the electronic online jihadi magazine The Echo of Jihad. 15 Al-Ansari listedthe many possibilities he saw the continent could offer to the worldwide jihad:African Governments are weak, divided, and corrupt. They lack, moreover, astrong army and effective security and intelligence services so that the mujahedeencan easily organize themselves and move without being discovered. Theborders are poorly guarded, and weapons are available cheaply and in vastquantities. According to Al-Ansari, the notion of jihad is widespread on thecontinent, while, still according to him, the numerous ethnic conflicts and civilwars have fostered in Africans a certain readiness to die a heroic death in battle.This readiness would increase the potential to wage a successful jihad. It isremarkable how, in his analysis of the potentials of the African continent, al-Ansari thought in stereotypes similar to those of his adversaries in the US. Hisanalysis of the jihadi potential of the African continent was sketched, as it were,in imperialistic geostrategic platitudes. According to Oliver Roy this is nocoincidence as both sides in the War on Terror share the notion that the ‘Clashof Civilisations’ sketched by Samuel Huntington is the reality in which theirbattle is set. Islamists in fact frame the world in modes and discourses verysimilar to that of Washington-based think tanks. 16 Northern Mali almost perfectlyfitted the picture drawn by both, especially after the Algerian GroupeSalafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) established itself in the area.141516Shortly after 9/11, the Malian government proceeded to extradite 25 Pakistani membersof the Tablighi Jamaat. The movement is now leading a dwindling existence inNorthern Mali.Abu Azzam al-Ansari, ‘Al-Qa’ida (...) tattajih nahwa Ifriqiyya’. In Sada al-Jihad 7(Jumada al-Ula 1427), pp. 18-20. A translation and analysis of the article areavailable on www.sofir.org/sarchives/005627.php. Last checked 13/07/09.Roy, O. 2004: 77-78.